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INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution in its infancy, has
had occasion to make only a relatively small number of decisions about
which defendants and which crimes to prosecute. But virtually every choice
it has made has been attacked: the first defendant, Thomas Lubanga, was not
senior enough and the crimes with which he was charged-war crimes in-
volving the use of child soldiers-were not serious enough; the Court
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should have investigated British soldiers for war crimes committed in Iraq;
the ICC should not be prosecuting only rebel perpetrators in Uganda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo; the Court's focus on situations in Africa is
inappropriate; the Court has focused insufficient attention on gender crimes;
and so on.' Much of the debate about such selection decisions centers on
whether the ICC, and particularly its prosecutor, are improperly motivated by
political considerations. Critics charge that selection decisions are inappropri-
ately political,2 while the Court's current prosecutor,3 Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
counters that his decisions are apolitical-that he is simply implementing
the law enunciated in the ICC's statute.4 Most recently, some authors have
suggested that the prosecutor's role is inevitably political and should be
1. Such criticisms are articulated in political fora, news media, and academic litera-
ture. See infra Part II.A.
2. See, e.g., Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders,
WORLD AFF., Spring 2009, available at http://www.worldaffairsjoumal.org/articles/2009-
Spring/full-DeWaalFlint.html (expressing worry among Africans that the ICC "may be turning
criminal prosecution into a selective political instrument"); Richard John Galvin, The ICC
Prosecutor Collateral Damage, and NGOs: Evaluating the Risk of a Politicized Prosecution,
13 U. MIAMI INT'L & ComtP. L. REv. 1, 48-80 (2005) (assessing the potential risk of NGOs
taking advantage of the ICC's independent prosecutor to launch politically motivated investi-
gations and prosecutions into U.S. military activity); Matthew Happold, The International
Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L. 159, 170-73 (2007)
(explaining criticism that the ICC was used as political weapon of the Ugandan government);
Charles Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 445, 462-65
(2009) (discussing criticism by African leaders that the ICC is political); William A. Schabas,
Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the International Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 535, 549 (2010) (arguing ICC case selection decisions are inherently political); David Pal-
lister, Human Rights: Growing Clamour to Remove the Hague Prosecutor Who Wants
Sudanese President Arrested, THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 18, 2008, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/18/humanrights.sudan (criticizing many of the prosecu-
tor's decisions as one-sided and political).
3. Moreno-Ocampo's term as ICC prosecutor ends in June 2012 and he cannot be
re-elected. Joshua Rozenberg, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo Is the Best Asset of Those
Opposed to the International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 21, 2011, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/law/20 11 /apr/21 /moreno-ocampo-international-criminal-court.
4. For example, in a keynote address at the Council on Foreign Relations, Moreno-
Ocampo stated that his "duty is to apply the law without political considerations. Other actors
have to adjust to the law." Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor for the Int'l Criminal Court,
Keynote Address at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., 6 (Feb. 4, 2010).
Prosecutors of other tribunals have made similar statements. For example, International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia prosecutor Louise Arbour espoused the view that
politics have no place in selection decisions in response to criticisms that the indictment of
Slobodan Milogevi6 would impair efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis. Arbour Milosevic
and "Yesterday's Men," INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, June 5, 1999, http://
iwpr.net/report-news/arbour-milosevic-and-quotyesterdays-menquot. Cf James A. Gold-
ston, More Candour About Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 383, 387 (2010) (observing that sup-
porters of the ICC respond to criticism with "a pristine notion of 'law in a vacuum' that, at
its extreme, stretches credibility").
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acknowledged as such.5 The participants in this debate rarely define what
they mean by "political," nor will this Article attempt such definition. In-
stead, this Article seeks to reframe the debate about the ICC's selection
decisions by shifting from the current focus on the boundaries between
"legal" and "political" criteria to a constructive dialogue about the most
appropriate goals and priorities for the Court. The ICC's core selectivity
problem is that the Court lacks sufficiently clear goals and priorities to justi-
fy its decisions. States created the ICC to adjudicate "the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,"6 but they
gave it a budget that enables only a handful of prosecutions per year.7 Per-
sons charged with implementing the Court's broad mandate-its prosecutor
and judges-must thus select a few cases from among thousands.8 Yet the
international community has provided the Court virtually no guidance about
what goals it should seek to achieve through the cases it selects, beyond the
vague mandate to strive to end impunity for "the most serious crimes."9
This lack of clearly defined goals and priorities poses a serious chal-
lenge to the ICC's legitimacy. If the ICC is to prosper, it must build its
5. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 604 (7th ed.
2008) ("Political considerations, power, and patronage will continue to determine who is to be
tried for international crimes and who [is] not."); Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Ex-
pressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002) (noting that political
considerations resulted in creation of only two ad hoc tribunals when many other situations
justified creation of such tribunals); Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion Within
the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 71, 74 (2004) (discussing interrela-
tionship of law and politics at the ICC); Goldston, supra note 4; A.K.A. Greenawalt, Justice
Without Politics?: Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 586-88 (2007) (asserting that the prosecutor has inherently political
functions and the current structure of the ICC makes it impossible to have an apolitical prose-
cutor); Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 941, 946 (2010)
(arguing that the ICC is political in that it draws distinctions between friends and enemies of
the international community); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International
Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Crim-
inal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 50 (2007) ("The subset selected for prosecution has
historically been, and will inevitably remain, contingent on discretionary political decisions
made by international rather than local officials.").
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., opened for signature July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7. The Court's current prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, projects that the Court will
adjudicate a minimum of three cases between 2009 and 2012. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE
OF THE PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012, at 7 (2010) [hereinafter PROSECU-
TORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012], available at http://www.icc-cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-
3650-4514-AA62-D229D 128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013 .pdf.
8. Current levels of armed conflict and repression mean that war crimes and crimes
against humanity are being committed in numerous situations around the world. HUMAN
SEC. REPORT PROJECT, THE CHANGING FACE OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE 24-25, fig. 1.2
(2005), available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR20
0 5/2005Human
SecurityReport-Part 1-ChangingFaceOfViolence.pdf.
9. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl. ("Affirming that the most serious crimes of con-
cern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished... ").
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legitimacy among relevant audiences-states, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), affected communities, and the global community. Legitimacy
is a complex, multidimensional concept. 1° I use the term herein to refer to
the perception among relevant audiences that the ICC's actions are worthy
of respect." Such legitimacy depends to a significant degree on whether
such audiences perceive the Court-primarily the prosecutor but also the
judges'E-as selecting appropriate crimes and defendants for prosecution. If
important constituencies view the Court as making the wrong choices, they
are likely to withdraw their support from the Court and possibly even seek
its destruction. State actors are a particularly important legitimacy audience
for the ICC-without their support the Court would have no funding, no
defendants to prosecute, and no evidence with which to conduct prosecu-
tions. The support of NGOs is also crucial to the Court's work, which relies
heavily on the input of NGO networks for its investigations. 3 Indeed, the
globalization of communications increasingly means that an institution's
legitimacy depends on the opinions of ordinary citizens around the world.
All of these audiences will assess the Court's legitimacy in significant de-
gree according to their evaluations of its selection decisions.
Evaluations of selection decisions are much more important to the
ICC's legitimacy than to that of most national criminal law systems. In na-
tional systems, selectivity-discretionary decisions not to prosecute even
though prosecution appears warranted'a-operates largely at the margins.
10. Hilary Charlesworth, Conclusion: The Legitimacies of International Law, in FAULT
LINES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 389, 396 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc Coicaud
eds., 2010).
11. This sociological approach to legitimacy is usually attributed to Max Weber. MAX
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 325 (Talcott Parsons ed.,
A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947) (arguing belief in legitimacy is normally one
element that influences obedience). In prior work I have explored other aspects of the ICC's
legitimacy, including those associated with legal factors and moral principles. See Margaret
M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1400, 1436-37 (2009) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitu-
tion, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789-97 (2005)). My use of "legitimacy" here is closely tied to
the concept of "authority," which refers to the justified use of power. See Bruce Cronin & Ian
Hurd, Introduction, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AU-
THORITY 3, 6 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008).
12. As elaborated below, infra Part I.B, the prosecutor has significant discretion in
making selection decisions but the Court's judges also play an important role in some cases.
For that reason, this Article, unlike some others addressing the topic, refers to selection deci-
sions as decisions of the Court rather than merely of the prosecutor.
13. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alterna-
tive Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 146 (2009)
(describing the OTP's reliance on public statements from NGOs to support the assertion that
withdrawal of the Uganda arrest warrants would be inappropriate). NGOs have also been
essential in encouraging states to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and to adopt implement-
ing domestic legislation. Jalloh, supra note 2, at 450-5 1.
14. ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 192 (2005) (quoting KENNETH KULP DAVIS, DIS-
CRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 163 (1969)).
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Prosecutors are expected to prosecute the vast majority of serious cases;
and, on the rare occasions when a prosecutor's decision whether or not to
prosecute a case is controversial, such debates are generally limited to the
particular case. Given the massive numbers of cases national courts prose-
cute, only very exceptionally will a selection decision spark challenges to
the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. Moreover, nationally,
constituencies can usually agree on the result-prosecution and punish-
ment-even if they disagree about the justifying goals, such as retribution or
deterrence. In contrast, since the ICC is limited to prosecuting a handful of
cases out of thousands of potential cases, each selection attracts substantial
attention. Each decision expresses a statement about how the Court views its
role in the world, with which relevant audiences may agree or disagree. As
such, the ICC's inability to justify its selection decisions by reference to a
coherent theory of its goals and priorities undermines its efforts to build le-
gitimacy.
In the absence of a clear understanding of the ICC's goals and priorities,
the Court's current prosecutor has relied largely on two strategies to justify
his selection decisions: (1) he has appealed to the gravity of the crimes se-
lected; and (2) he has sought to portray his decisions as reached impartially,
objectively, independently, and transparently. 5 This Article will demonstrate
that these strategies cannot succeed in their goal of enhancing the ICC's
legitimacy. The concept of gravity-that certain crimes are so serious as to
merit international adjudication-was instrumental in motivating states to
establish the ICC. Nonetheless, there is little agreement even among the
Court's supporters about what makes crimes grave enough for international
attention, and even less about which crimes are the most deserving of ICC
resources.16 Nor can principles such as impartiality and objectivity effective-
ly constrain the prosecutor's discretion in the absence of coherent
underlying goals and priorities. Rather, to enhance the ICC's legitimacy, it
will be necessary to develop such goals and priorities in a manner that re-
flects the values of the ICC's constitutive communities.
In addition to exposing this weakness in the ICC's foundation, this Arti-
cle aspires to point the way toward a coherent theoretical basis for ICC
selection decisions that has the potential to enhance the Court's legitimacy. I
argue that the traditional justifications for criminal law-deterrence and ret-
ribution-although they help to justify the ICC's work, do not provide an
adequate basis for selection decisions. The ICC's meager resources mean
15. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR [OTP], ICC, DRAFT POLICY PAPER
ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 6-8, 13 (2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
E278F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTP-Draftpolicypaperonpreliminary
examinations0410l.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS]
(discussing criteria behind the OTP's preliminary examination decisions); ICC-OTP, CRITERIA
FOR SELECTION OF SITUATIONS AND CASES 1-7 (2006) (unpublished policy paper) (on file
with author) [hereinafter DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION] (enumerating
specific criteria for selection decisions).
16. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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that it can have only a limited impact in each of these areas. Moreover,
neither of these theories provides an adequate basis for an ordinal ranking
of potential cases. The relative culpability of all potential defendants
worldwide is impracticable, if not impossible, to measure. Nor is there any
basis to determine which crimes are more likely than others to be deterred
by international prosecution. In fact, even assuming international criminal
law has a deterrent effect-a highly contested proposition-there is good
reason to doubt whether selection decisions can influence that effect. More
recent theories of restorative justice, which urge a greater focus on rebuild-
ing relationships, also provide a partial justification for the work of the ICC,
but do not provide an adequate basis for the Court's selection decisions. The
Court simply lacks the resources to make any significant progress toward
such locally oriented goals.
17
Instead, as several scholars have suggested, the ICC's focus should be on
expressing global norms. 8 I move the discussion of the Court's expressive
role forward by arguing that the Court's decisions about which situations and
cases to select for prosecution should aim primarily to maximize the Court's
expressive impact. Expressivism therefore is not just the best justification
for the ICC's work; it also provides the most appropriate theoretical basis
for the Court's resource allocation decisions. While the ICC can make only
a very small impact in terms of such goals as retribution and deterrence, the
Court can effectively promote global norms with a limited number of illus-
trative prosecutions.
The expressive prescription raises questions about what global norms
the ICC should seek to express and in what order of priority-questions to
which there are no clear answers, just as there is no international consensus
about the goals of the Court more broadly. Nonetheless, I argue that by fo-
cusing explicitly on an expressive agenda, ICC selection decision makers
can stimulate a dialogic process through which norms are expressed, feed-
back is received, and, ideally, consensus builds over time.
The argument proceeds in three parts. First, I explain why selectivity
presents a serious threat to the ICC's legitimacy and, in particular, why it is
more problematic for an international system than for national systems. I
further elucidate the role that the concept of gravity played in enabling the
international community to establish a highly selective criminal law regime
without a defined mandate. The next Part critiques the primary approaches
17. While the specifics of restorative justice are still being debated, it is generally un-
derstood that it refers to a system where victims and offenders work together to remedy the
damage done by the offense. The process is seen as an alternative to, or as an additional, sepa-
rate process from, criminal prosecution. See infra Part III.A.3.
18. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
173-76 (2007); Amann, supra note 5, at 95; Mirjan Damaska, What Is the Point of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT, L. REV. 329, 345 (2008); David Luban, Fairness to
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds.,
2010); Sloane, supra note 5, at 44.
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that the prosecutor and commentators have taken to address the problem that
selectivity poses to the ICC's legitimacy, including attempts to rely on
objectivity, independence, impartiality, and transparency. The final Part
proposes an expressive theory for selection decisions at the ICC.
I. SELECTIVITY AS A THREAT TO THE ICC's LEGITIMACY
A. The Critics
No aspect of the ICC's work has been more controversial to date than
its decisions about which situations and cases to prosecute. 19 Every selection
decision the Court makes is scrutinized, and many have given rise to strong
criticisms. Such expressions of disapproval have come from each of the
ICC's primary evaluative audiences-states, NGOs, communities most af-
fected by the ICC's work, academics, and the global community generally.
State actors have opposed vociferously some of the ICC's decisions about
whether to open investigations. In particular, leaders of African states, who
had formed one of the most supportive constituencies of the ICC, have be-
gun to object to the ICC's exclusive focus on prosecuting African
defendants."z African leaders have expressed particular dismay at the ICC's
decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir.21
In 2009, in the wake of the Bashir indictment, the African Union adopted a
resolution formally condemning the action and urging states not to cooperate
19. The terms "situation" and "case" are terms of art at the ICC. A "situation" refers to
a geographic and sometimes temporal space where crimes within the Court's jurisdiction are
alleged to have been committed. A "case" refers to one or more defendants and one or more
crimes within the Court's jurisdiction that those defendants are alleged to have committed. See
DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15, at 1; see also Situation in
the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
50 (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf (defining
"case" for the purposes of admissibility at the investigation stage as comprising the persons
and crimes "likely to be the focus of the investigation").
20. See Flint & de Waal, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that "Africans were once the most
passionate supporters of the ICC" but that Africans are increasingly skeptical because the OTP
has not initiated cases outside Africa, and view warrants against Bashir and others as using
prosecution as a "selective political instrument"); Jalloh, supra note 2, at 462-65 (discussing
strong support for the ICC among African states as well as recent criticisms).
21. Flint & de Waal, supra note 2, at 36; see also Pallister, supra note 2 (noting the
African Union quickly denounced the OTP's decision to seek arrest warrant of Bashir); ALEX-
is ARIEFF, RHODA MARGESSON & MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34665, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES IN AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 15
(2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA503976&Location
=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (noting governments of South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Benin, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Morocco "expressed concern" about
the arrest warrant).
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with the ICC.2 2 The following year, Kenyan political leaders reacted to the
ICC decision to open an investigation into post-election violence in Kenya
by passing a motion in parliament calling for withdrawal from the Court. 3
African audiences more broadly, including the communities most directly
affected by the Court's work, have also been increasingly critical. In a 2009
article, Professor Charles Jalloh cited a "growing perception" that "Africans
have become the sacrificial lambs in the ICC's struggle for global
legitimation."24 The Bashir arrest warrant has been controversial in Sudan,
with some Sudanese worrying that it will do more harm than good in their
country.25 African and non-African audiences alike have questioned the
legitimacy of the ICC prosecutor's decision to pursue rebel defendants but
not those associated with the governments in power.26 The prosecutor has
also been challenged for his decision not to pursue nationals of powerful
states, in particular, his refusal to investigate war crimes allegedly
committed by British soldiers in Iraq.
27
22. Assembly of the African Union [AU], Decision on the Meeting of African States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 2-13, Assem-
bly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1 (July 3, 2009); see also Jalloh, supra note 2, at 482-85
(discussing African objections to the ICC's work specifically in the context of ICC jurisdiction
over heads of state); African Union Moves Aggressively to Shield Bashir from Prosecution,
SUDAN TRIBUNE, July 29, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/African-Union-moves-
aggressively,35786/.
23. See Peter Opiyo, Parliament Wants Kenya to Withdraw from ICC, THE STANDARD
(Kenya), Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000025340&
cid=4&.
24. Jalloh, supra note 2, at 463.
25. See Flint & de Waal, supra note 2, at 35 ("Many Sudanese fear that an arrest war-
rant could make things significantly worse, perhaps bringing about the very sorts of atrocities
that the ICC is meant to deter."); see also ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., supra note 21, at 13 ("Other
Sudanese reactions [to the decision to seek an arrest warrant of Bashir] have focused on the
potential impact of an arrest warrant on ongoing peace processes, peacekeeping operations,
and humanitarian relief... "); Alex de Waal & Gregory H. Stanton, Should President Omar
al-Bashir of Sudan Be Charged and Arrested by the International Criminal Court? An Ex-
change of Views, 4 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 329, 329 (2009) (asserting an arrest
warrant is risky and could impede attempts at peace and democracy in Sudan with limited
potential to further justice and human rights).
26. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 191; see also Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Un-
der the Rome Statute, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(manuscript at 14-16) (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2009), available at
http://ssm.con/abstract=1270369; Flint & de Waal, supra note 2, at 36 (expressing worry
among Africans that the ICC "may be turning criminal prosecution into a selective political
instrument"); Happold, supra note 2, at 170-72 (explaining criticism the ICC received for
focusing investigations and prosecutions on rebels rather than state actors despite evidence
that both parties committed atrocities).
27. See, e.g., William Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 731, 742-43 (2008) (questioning the
ICC prosecutor's decision not to investigate crimes of British soldiers in Iraq); Press Release,
ICC Watch, Why Won't the ICC Move Against Tony Blair on War Crimes? (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.iccwatch.org/pdf/Press%20Release%2004FeblO.pdf (discussing failure of the ICC
to investigate alleged war crimes of British leaders and soldiers).
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Members of the NGO community, even those committed to supporting
the Court, have been critical of the prosecutor's selection decisions in im-
portant respects. In particular, some argue that the prosecutor was wrong to
charge the Court's first defendant, Thomas Lubanga, only with recruiting
child soldiers when there was evidence that he was also responsible for crimes
of sexual violence and other serious war crimes.28 NGOs have also objected to
the Court's failure to pursue leaders and situations outside of Africa. 9
Not everyone has been dissatisfied with the ICC's choices. Many state
actors, members of affected communities, commentators, and NGO activists
have praised the ICC's decisions about what situations to investigate and
what cases to prosecute.30 Moreover, not all of these challenges to the ap-
propriateness of the ICC's selection decisions will negatively impact upon
the Court's legitimacy. When leaders with little personal legitimacy, such as
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Muammar Gaddafi, attack the Court, their
views are widely discounted.31 Nonetheless, in these early years of the
28. WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, Beni Declaration, in MAKING A
STATEMENT 17, 17 (June 2008), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/publications/articles/
docs/MakingAStatement-WebFinal.pdf (reporting that various women's rights and human
rights NGOs complain that the ICC improperly focused on the crime of conscripting child
soldiers though the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) had committed many other more
serious crimes); see also Flint & de Waal, supra note 2, at 30 (noting shock felt by Congolese
human rights groups and women's groups at learning of limited charges brought against
Lubanga and belief that the OTP's choice of charges threatened to offend victims and under-
mine trust in the ICC and OTP); Justin Coleman, Comment, Showing Its Teeth: The
International Criminal Court Takes on Child Conscription in the Congo, but Is Its Bark Worse
than Its Bite?, 26 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 765, 780 (2007) (noting criticism by and concerns
of Congolese people and foreign organizations regarding the OTP's failure to pursue prosecu-
tion of widespread incidents of rape, murder, and torture).
29. See, e.g., ICC Watch, supra note 27, at I (accusing the ICC of failing to prosecute
Tony Blair despite alleged involvement in war crimes).
30. See, e.g., Maxwell Masava, Nyong'o, Karua Praise ICC Hearing, THE STAR (Kenya),
Sept. 5, 2011, http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/nationalV39062-nyongo-karua-praise-icc-
hearing (reporting praise from some Kenyan political leaders for ICC action in the Kenya
situation); African Groups Praise ICC on Sudan but Ask for Fairness, SUDAN TRIBUNE, July 17,
2008, http://www.sudantribune.com/African-rights-groups-praise-ICC,27901 (reporting that
African human rights organizations supported the ICC prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant
of Sudan President Omar al-Bashir); Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Libya: Rights Groups Praise Arrest-
Warrant Request for Kadafi, Callfor Action in Syria, BABYLON & BEYOND (May 16, 2011, 9:42
AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/05Alibya-ights-groups-praise-icc-
action-against-kadafi-call-for-more.html (observing that human rights groups such as Amnesty
International praised ICC action in Libya while calling for more consistent application
elsewhere).
31. Compare Mugabe Wantsr [sic] Bush, Blair Charged by International Criminal Court,
THE ZIMDIASPORA, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?option=com-content&
view=article&id=4562:mugabe-calls-for-bush-and-blair-to-be-brought-before-intemational-cri
minal-court&catid=38:travel-tips&Itemid=18 (describing Mugabe's claims that the ICC is
hypocritical for not prosecuting Bush and Blair) with Opinion, Mugabe Should Face Trial for
Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/
opinion/23iht-edmugabe.1.19632133.html (reporting recommendation of Physicians for Hu-
man Rights that Mugabe be investigated for crimes against humanity).
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Court's existence, the mounting criticisms have given reason for concern. In
light of the Court's high degree of selectivity, widespread criticisms of its
selections or critiques from highly respected sources can result in broader
challenges to the Court's legitimacy. To withstand such challenges, the ICC
must be able to articulate its selection decisions in terms of goals and priori-
ties that relevant audiences accept.
B. Mechanics of ICC Selection Decisions
Although many commentators treat the problem of selectivity at the
ICC as entirely one of prosecutorial discretion, in fact, the ICC's judges also
play a significant role in determining what situations and cases the Court
investigates and prosecutes.32 An ICC investigation is triggered in one of
three ways: the Security Council refers a situation under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter; a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute)
refers a situation; or the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu
on the basis of information from any source.33 If the prosecutor acts proprio
motu, he or she can only initiate an investigation after obtaining the permis-
sion of a three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber.34 Furthermore, regardless of the
triggering mechanism, the prosecutor must determine that there is a reason-
able basis to proceed before starting an investigation-a determination over
which the judges have powers of review.35 The reasonable basis determina-
tion requires the prosecutor, and sometimes the judges, to decide whether:
(1) national courts are already investigating or prosecuting in good faith; (2)
the situation involves cases that are of sufficient gravity for ICC adjudica-
tion; and (3) investigation and prosecution "serve the interests of justice. '36
The prosecutor makes initial determinations of these questions.37 However,
if the prosecutor declines to investigate a situation based on his or her evalu-
ation of the interests of justice, the Pre-Trial Chamber judges have the
32. One reason the selectivity problem has been largely framed in terms of prosecutori-
al discretion is that the judges have yet to exercise most of their powers to shape the situations
and cases brought before the Court. Moreover, the law related to selection decisions remains
contested in several respects. For example, although Article 15 of the Rome Statute states that
the prosecutor "may" initiate investigations based on evidence received from any source, some
argue the prosecutor is required to initiate an investigation if a reasonable basis exists. Rome
Statute, supra note 6, art. 15; Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an
Investigation, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 701, 704 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). The current prosecutor has interpreted the statute
to require him to seek approval for investigations whenever a reasonable basis exists. See infra
notes 35-40 and accompanying text. Another dispute surrounds the circumstances under
which judicial review of prosecutorial decisions not to proceed is permitted. See infra note 41.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 13-15.
34. Id. arts. 15, 39(2)(b)(iii).
35. Id. arts. 15, 53.




power to invalidate the decision, requiring the prosecutor to investigate.38 If
the prosecutor decides not to proceed on one of the other grounds and the
referring entity asks for review of the decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber judg-
es may ask the prosecutor to reconsider the decision.3 9 Moreover, if a state
with jurisdiction notifies the prosecutor that it is investigating or prosecut-
ing, the prosecutor must defer to the state unless the Pre-Trial Chamber
judges authorize the investigation.4"
Once a situation is under investigation, decisions about which cases-
crimes and defendants-to prosecute rest almost entirely with the
prosecutor. However, if the prosecutor decides not to pursue any cases in a
situation and bases that decision entirely on the interests of justice, the
Pre-Trial Chamber judges may once again invalidate the decision and
require him to proceed.4 The Pre-Trial Chamber judges can also request
reconsideration if the decision is based on other grounds.42 Moreover, the
judges can decide at any time that a case is not admissible because a state is
prosecuting in good faith or the case is not of sufficient gravity.43 Finally,
while the prosecutor decides what charges to bring against an accused, the
judges have the power to recharacterize the facts to convict a defendant of
crimes not charged as long as they stay within the factual parameters of the
charging document.44
In sum, while the ICC prosecutor enjoys substantial discretion in decid-
ing which cases and situations to investigate and prosecute, the Court's
judges also have the power under the statute to contribute significantly to
selection decisions. For that reason, this Article, unlike others addressing
matters of ICC selection, refers to decisions of the Court rather than limit-
ing the discussion to prosecutorial decisions. Although in the first instance
selections are a matter of the prosecutor's discretion, the judges will have
the last word in some cases, such as when they disagree with the prosecutor
about the interests of justice.45
38. Id. art. 53(3).
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 18(2).
41. Id. art. 53(3)(b). The statute is unclear whether judicial review is permitted only
when the prosecutor decides not to pursue any case in the situation (thereby effectively closing
the investigation) or, alternatively, whenever the prosecutor decides not to pursue a particular
individual. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-185, Decision on Application
under Rule 103, 21 (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc627395.pdf.
42. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(3)(a).
43. Id. art. 19(1).
44. Regulations of the Court as amended on 14 June and 14 November 2007, ICC-BD/
01-02-07, Reg. 55 (entered into force Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF5E9E76-F99C-41OA-85F4-01C4A2CE300C/0/ICCBDO10207ENG
.pdf; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04/-01/06 OA 15 OA 16, Judg-
ment on the Appeals of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor, [ 88-100 (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/doc790147.pdf.
45. In practice, however, it may be difficult for the judges to force the prosecutor to
allocate resources to an investigation.
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C. ICC Legitimacy Requires Increased Clarity of
Community, Goals, and Priorities
For an organization to be legitimate in the sociological sense employed
herein, it must be "identified with purposes and goals that are consistent
with the broader norms and values of its society."46 Only once an organiza-
tion has such "purposive" legitimacy can mechanisms such as good process
contribute to its legitimation.4 7 Moreover, an institution with purposive legit-
imacy can only maintain its legitimacy over time "by satisfactorily
achieving the community's purposes."'48 An institution's failure to act pursu-
ant to the values of its constitutive community will therefore undermine its
legitimacy.
49
The ICC currently suffers from low purposive legitimacy-it lacks both
a defined community to which it is responsible, and accepted values or goals
associated with its work. The ICC's deficiencies in these regards distinguish
it from national courts and explain why it is more important for the ICC to
articulate acceptable justifications for its selection decisions than it is for
national courts to do so.
Selectivity is a feature of virtually all criminal courts. This is true even
in civil law systems that subscribe to the principle of mandatory prosecu-
tion, whereby prosecutors are theoretically required to prosecute every
crime for which there is sufficient evidence.50 In practice, prosecutors and
judges in such systems turn away some potential cases, often because the
cases are perceived as insufficiently serious.5 Moreover, national criminal
law, like international criminal law, is imperfectly theorized. Deterrent and
retributive rationales compete with one another and, more recently, expres-
sivism and restorative justice have joined the fray. Like the ICC prosecutor,
national prosecutors operate without a consistent theoretical foundation in
deciding which cases to prosecute-disparate goals push in different direc-
tions.52
46. Cronin & Hurd, supra note 11, at 6.
47. Id.
48. Wayne Sandholtz, Creating Authority by the Council: The International Criminal
Tribunals, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY,
supra note 11, at 131, 140.
49. Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405, 419-24 (2006) (stating that moral legitimacy
requires adherence to goals for which an institution was established); Mirjan R. Damaika, The
International Criminal Court Between Aspiration and Achievement, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 19, 20 (2009) ("For these courts, as for all fledgling institutions, the viability of
professed goals is a close cousin of legitimacy.").
50. Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and
International Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 124, 127 (2005).
51. CRYER, supra note 14, at 192.
52. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV.




Yet at least in consolidated democracies, national courts are widely con-
sidered legitimate for at least three reasons. First, and most importantly, unlike
the ICC, national courts are embedded in defined communities.53 Such courts
are created by and responsive to their communities, which share a high level
of agreement about the goals and priorities of the criminal justice system not-
withstanding underlying theoretical debates. The more homogenous the
society, the more this is true. Social agreement is never perfect. In the hetero-
geneous United States, criminal law is characterized by fierce disputes about
such issues as whether resources should focus on drugs or white collar crime
and whether an act such as carrying a handgun should be a crime at all.54 De-
spite such disputes at the margins, however, national communities generally
have a high level of agreement about what crimes should be prosecuted and
what the priorities should be among them.5 5 Moreover, when courts fail
systematically to reflect the community's values, a properly functioning
democratic process corrects the problem.56
In addition to this clarity of constituency, national courts usually enjoy
much greater parity between available resources and the conduct the com-
munity wants to punish than does the ICC. In other words, the selectivity of
such courts is much less significant-they are expected to prosecute the vast
majority of serious violations of the relevant community's moral and some-
times regulatory norms. As such, it is often sufficient for the community to
agree on the result-prosecution and punishment-even if its members
disagree on the underlying values at stake.57 Members of the community
may disagree about whether criminals should be punished for retributive
53. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 96 (2005).
54. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
458-60 (1999) (noting the dichotomy of views on gun control laws in the United States
though empirical evidence is inconclusive about gun laws either causing or preventing crime).
55. Cf NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 76
(5th ed. 2010) ("[M]uch of the conduct that is made criminal under state law can also be pros-
ecuted federally"); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 735 (8th ed. 2007) (noting that at least thirty-three states passed antiracket-
eering statutes that closely mirrored the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act after it was passed).
56. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 63, 64-65 (1994) (noting many states in the United States elect judges, that state statutes
and constitutional amendments can be passed to overrule irresponsible judgments, and the
U.S. Congress has power to create rules of procedure for federal courts and to restrict jurisdic-
tion of federal courts); see also James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On
the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 343, 343 (1998) ("Not even
the most powerful courts in the world have the power of the 'purse' or 'sword'; with limited
institutional resources, courts are therefore uncommonly dependent upon the goodwill of their
constituents for both support and compliance.").
57. See generally Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L.
REV. 1733, 1734-37 (1995) (arguing practitioners do not attempt to agree on underlying prin-
ciples but rather specific outcomes).
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reasons (they deserve it) or in service of utilitarian goals (such as deter-
rence) but most agree that punishment is the right result in the vast array of
cases.
Finally, the long history and tradition of national criminal justice means
that national courts often enjoy substantial reserves of institutional legitima-
cy. 58 Societies accept that criminal courts are important and worthy of re-
respect as a general matter, even if they sometimes make mistakes. Only
very marginal political players object to the very institution of criminal jus-
tice. This historical respect, along with the sheer volume of cases national
courts prosecute, means that no single decision a national court makes will
have a significant impact upon the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice
system. Even a highly controversial outcome, like that in the O.J. Simpson
case, has limited repercussions for the system as a whole.
59
The ICC, in contrast, enjoys consensus neither about the community it
is intended to serve nor about the goals for which it was established.
1. What Is the ICC's Constitutive Community?
Not just the ICC, but international criminal law more broadly, has long
suffered from a lack of agreement about its appropriate community of interest.
With the possible exception of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, interna-
tional criminal law institutions have all been tom between seeking primarily
to serve the ephemeral "global community" and acting as surrogates for ill-
functioning or nonfunctioning local justice systems. 60 The architects of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals seem to have imagined international criminal
law largely as a global endeavor.61 The primary purpose of those tribunals
58. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1787, 1828-29 (2005) (discussing the "reservoir of trust" that the U.S. Supreme Court
has that allows it to retain legitimacy despite controversial or heavily criticized rulings).
59. Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and
Magic Bullets, 67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 989, 990-91 (1996) (arguing that any efforts at immediate
reform after the O.J. Simpson trial will cause more harm than good and any reforms should be
made incrementally and slowly); see also W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, the Dream
Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1996) (disa-
greeing with the verdict in the Simpson case but asserting that "the system functioned more or
less as it was designed" and any knee-jerk reform of the criminal justice system is inappropri-
ate).
60. Sloane, supra note 5, at 41 ("[International criminal law] purports to serve multiple
communities, including both literal ones-for example, ethnic or national communities-and
the figurative 'international community,' which, needless to say, is not monolithic.").
61. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States at the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals, Opening Statement for the United States of America at the Palace of Justice,
Nuremberg, Germany (Nov. 21, 1945), reprinted in THE NUREMBERG CASE 30, 34 (1947) ("Civi-
lization can afford no compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if
we deal ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously sur-
vive:'); Brig. Gen. Telford Taylor, Chief Counsel for War Crimes, Opening Statement of the
Prosecution (Dec. 9, 1946), reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 28 (1949) ("It is our deep
obligation to all peoples of the world to show why and how these things happened.").
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was to vindicate the moral conscience of the world, and little thought was
given to involving or compensating victims, nor was healing Germany and
Japan the principal goal. With its rebirth in the 1990s, however, the constitu-
tive communities of international criminal law became increasingly unclear.
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have a global orientation in that they enjoy
primacy over national courts, are staffed by non-nationals, and permit little
victim involvement in the process.62 At the same time, the goals articulated
for those tribunals include fostering peace and reconciliation in the societies
where the crimes were committed. 63 This local orientation has affected the
tribunals' practices, including selection decisions. For example, the ICTY
has prosecuted defendants from the various ethnic groups involved in the
conflict in an apparent effort at interethnic reconciliation.' The ICTR has
not engaged in this kind of ethnic balancing, but has selected cases from
various parts of the country in the name of regional equity.65 Most recently,
a number of "hybrid" tribunals have been created that include both national
and international participants and, in some cases, adjudicate both national
62. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia art, 9(2),
May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.icty.org/
x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute-sept08_en.pdf ("The International Tribunal shall have
primacy over national courts."); id. arts. 16-17 (stating staff of the OTP and Registry will be
appointed by the Secretary-General on recommendations from the prosecutor and registrar);
see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 8(2), Nov. 8, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] ("The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the
primacy over national courts of all States."); id. arts. 15-16 (stating staff of OTP and Registry
will be appointed by the Secretary-General on recommendations from the prosecutor and
registrar); Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice: Analysis of
Victims'Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court,
17 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 11 (2005) (noting victims' participation in the ICTY and ICTR were
extremely limited); cf. Robert D. Sloane, Sentencing for the 'Crime of Crimes': The Evolving
'Common Law' of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. INT'L
CRtM. JUST. 713, 733 (2007) ("The ICTR, for better or worse, represents principally the inter-
ests and values of the amorphous international community rather than those of Rwanda, the
victims of the genocide or any other local community.").
63. See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925,929-32 (2000)
(citing statements from delegates of the Permanent Members of the Security Council as articulat-
ing six goals of the ICTY providing justice for victims, establishing accountability of
perpetrators, deterring commission of more atrocities in Balkans, aiding in restoring peace, de-
veloping a truthful historic record to prevent future atrocities, and deterring atrocities globally).
64. It is far from clear that such efforts have been successful. See, e.g., James Meernik,
Victor's Justice or the Law? Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 47 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 140, 147 (2003) (noting claims by Serbs that
they were singled out for prosecution as villains and claims by some Muslim defendants that
they were only prosecuted to provide ethnic diversity to ICTY's prosecutions).
65. Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 146, 153 (2005).
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and international laws. 66 These tribunals are even more torn between local
and global objectives.
The ICC inherited international criminal law's mission schizophrenia.
On the one hand, the Rome Statute's preamble suggests a global orientation,
proclaiming that "all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures
pieced together in a shared heritage" and stating that the Court is being
created "for the sake of present and future generations. '67 The Court's
structure-potentially global reach yet limited resources-also suggests
that it is intended to achieve global rather than local aims. At the same time,
the Rome Statute includes provisions clearly aimed at addressing local
needs, such as those providing for victim protection and participation and
the award of reparations.68
This structural ambiguity as to community orientation is reflected in
divergent expectations of the Court's role in the world. On the one hand, many
view international criminal law as primarily a vehicle for global justice. For
example, practitioners of international criminal law, including prosecutors,
judges, and many NGO advocates, tend to consider such law, particularly as
implemented by the ICC, to be an instrument of global deterrence and
retribution. 69 They view themselves as human rights champions, fighting for
a world where the most egregious violations are prevented and punished.70
The global vision also finds considerable support in the academic
literature.71 Steven Roach goes so far as to argue that the ICC has a moral
66. These include, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.
68. Id. arts. 68 (victim participation), 75 (reparations).
69. At the July 2010 ICC Review Conference in Kampala, the author interviewed five
current and former chief prosecutors of international tribunals who expressed the view that
deterrence and retributivism were primary goals.
70. See Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR.
REV. INT'L L. 361, 364 (2008) (noting that international criminal law work provides an oppor-
tunity to make a difference in some of the worst atrocities of our time and to contribute to a
new area of international law); see also Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. &
POL'Y SYMP. 37, 37 (1999) (stating that, as prosecutor at the ICTY and ICTR, her ambition
was to create an international criminal law forum to "eradicate the most outrageous violations
of human rights").
71. See, e.g., GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT 166-68
(2009) (arguing that the ICC shows promise as an institution for cosmopolitan justice); WIL-
LIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 68 (2006) (claiming that international criminal
tribunals aim to restore peace and security and encourage reconciliation, among other goals,
while national justice is targeted at social stability in a more "mundane sense"); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between
States' Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 131, 131 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) ("[The] increased
commonality of norms, procedures and processes in the world's legal systems ... [reflect] the
shared values these represent."); Stephanos Bibas & William Whitney Burke-White, Interna-
tional Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 652-53
(2010) ("International tribunals are ideally situated to restore and reconcile because their cases
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duty to investigate all serious crimes within its jurisdiction in the service of
global communitarianism. 72 On the other hand, not surprisingly, the
societies most affected by the crimes international courts adjudicate tend to
view the ICC as a vehicle for achieving local goals such as retribution and
restoration and, in ongoing conflicts, individual deterrence.73 A number of
scholars argue strongly for a local orientation to the ICC's work.74
These two visions of the role of the ICC can potentially lead to quite
different outcomes in terms of selection decisions. For example, global de-
terrence might be best served by prosecuting a small number of leaders in a
given situation, whereas a local retributive agenda probably requires a much
greater number of prosecutions. Local restoration might suggest prosecuting
both sides of a conflict, while global ideals of retributive proportionality
may require that only the side that committed the more egregious crimes be
prosecuted. This uncertainty of constitutive community makes it all the
more important for the ICC to articulate coherent rationales for its choices.
2. Gravity as a Stand-In for Goals and Priorities
The ICC also lacks a clear sense of its goals and priorities. In fact, the
Court's current prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has recognized this prob-
lem and early in his tenure suggested that the states parties work together to
clarify the institution's goals.7 The states parties have not yet heeded this
are high profile and their stage is global, rising above national politics and local ethnic ten-
sions."); Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 123, 127 (claiming that "inter-
national courts ... may be more impartial than national courts"; they have judges more
competent in humanitarian and international criminal law; they may be better able to handle
matters across states; they possess greater visibility; they protect universal values; and they
ensure greater uniformity in adjudication); David S. Koller, The Faith of the International
Criminal Lawyer, 40 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 1019, 1021-23 (2008) (noting "faith" in broad
ideals of international criminal law has substituted for actual philosophical or theoretical justi-
fications); Steven Roach, Value Pluralism, Liberalism, and the Cosmopolitan Intent of the
International Criminal Court, 4 J. HuM. RTS. 475, 485-86 (2005) (arguing for a global com-
munitarian approach to the ICC); Sloane, supra note 5, at 44 (arguing for a global expressivist
approach to international criminal law punishment).
72. Roach, supra note 71, at 483, 487.
73. See, e.g., Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 463, 471 (2009) (present-
ing empirical findings that victims in the former Yugoslavia call for retribution). A general
preference for retributive justifications has been demonstrated in empirical studies conducted
in Western countries. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 815, 823 n.25 (2007) (citing studies).
74. See, e.g., MARK FINDLAY & RALPH HENHAM, TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RETRIBUTIVE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE TRIAL PROCESS 271-75
(2005); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 61-62 (2010).
75. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at Informal Meeting of
Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs 9 (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www2.icc-
cpi.intlNR/rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_
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call, however, and selectivity remains a substantial obstacle to the Court's
legitimacy.
The explanation for the creation of an international court without clear
goals lies to a significant degree in the nature of the crimes at issue. The
ICC was created through the emotional-intuitive force of calls to prosecute
the most serious international crimes.7 6 The central motivation for the estab-
lishment of the Court was what in international criminal law has come to be
called "gravity"-that certain crimes are so heinous that international action
is warranted and perhaps even required.77 After the Holocaust, and later after
the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, many in the
international community felt that some response was necessary. 7s In the ab-
sence of more forceful measures to stop the crimes, criminal prosecutions of
the perpetrators seemed a fitting measure.79 With the establishment of the ad
hoc tribunals, the view that atrocious crimes should be prosecuted interna-
tionally in the absence of national prosecution gained traction. The creation
of the ICC was therefore largely spurred by the widely held view that very
grave crimes should be prosecuted.80 The centrality of gravity as a motivat-
ing force for the ICC is reflected in the Rome Statute's provisions limiting
the Court's jurisdiction to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
and aggression, and in the gravity threshold for admissibility discussed
above."s
English.pdf (suggesting that states parties should reflect on "the desired scope and role of the
Court").
76. See About the Court, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/
(last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (stating that the Court was established "to help end impunity for
the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community").
77. See deGuzman, supra note 11, at 1400.
78. See Overview, ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, http://
untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
79. Some authors suggest that the tribunals were created to mask the unwillingness of
powerful states to take more active steps to stop atrocities. See, e.g., Sloane, supra note 5, at
46-47 (citing Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 744-45
(1998)) ("There is more than a little truth to the critique that international prosecutions in the
wake of mass atrocities operate as a 'fig leaf' to cloak and ameliorate the collective guilt of
states and world leaders for their failure to intervene earlier or more decisively.").
80. Although the negotiations that led to the Rome Statute were initiated by Trinidad
and Tobago, which hoped that the Court would assist its efforts to combat drug trafficking, the
focus quickly turned to the crimes generally considered the most serious-war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and aggression. See Overview, ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L
CRIMINAL COURT, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2011).
81. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 1 (stating that the ICC "shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern"); id.
art. 5(1) (listing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression as crimes




The goal of prosecuting the most serious crimes might, at first glance,
seem to provide the Court with purposive legitimacy. In fact, one scholar has
taken the position that the ICC, along with the other international criminal
courts, enjoys substantial purposive legitimacy because its purpose-"the
prosecution of persons accused of major war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity"-is widely accepted.82 There are several flaws in this position.
First, while there is widespread agreement around the world that "major"
war crimes and crimes against humanity should be punished under some
circumstances, there is significant disagreement, even among the creators of
the Court, about when prosecution is appropriate. For example, some partic-
ipants in the negotiation of the Rome Statute felt that truth commissions
such as South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission can sometimes
adequately substitute for criminal prosecutions.83 This perspective led to the
inclusion in the statute of the provision allowing the prosecutor to decline to
investigate or prosecute "in the interests of justice.
'84
Moreover, there was no agreement among those who negotiated the
statute about which crimes are "major" enough for international jurisdiction,
nor has consensus developed since then. For example, there were conten-
tious debates about whether crimes against humanity should be defined to
include inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack or should instead be limited to cases where the attack was both
widespread and systematic.85 The compromise ultimately reached was to
use the disjunctive but to define the attack to require a state or organizational
policy to commit inhumane acts.86 A similar debate took place in the context
of war crimes. A significant number of states wanted to limit the Court's
jurisdiction to war crimes committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large
scale, while others felt strongly that the Court should have the ability to try
isolated individual war crimes.87 Ultimately, the drafters included an option-
al "threshold" for war crimes, that provides (rather incoherently) that the
Court has jurisdiction over war crimes "in particular" when they are
"committed as part of a plan or policy or on a large scale."8 8 The gravity
82. Sandholtz, supra note 48, at 133.
83. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commis-
sions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481, 483 & n.8 (2003)
(discussing divergent views expressed during Rome Statute negotiations on amnesties and
national truth and reconciliation efforts).
84. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 53(2)(c); see Chris Gallavin, Article 53 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the Interests of Justice?, 14 KING's C.L.J. 179,
185-86 (2003).
85. Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 79, 94-95
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
86. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7.
87. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International
Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 8 n.21 (1999).
88. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8.
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threshold for admissibility was also aimed at eliding differences of opinion
about when jurisdiction is appropriate. The term "gravity" was vague
enough to allow those on each side of the debate to believe the Court would
adhere to that side's vision of the ICC's role.
The ICC was thus founded on what one scholar has called an "incom-
pletely theorized agreement[]. '89 The various parties to the negotiation
agreed on the result-creating a Court-but did not agree on a foundational
principle to guide the Court's actions. 90 The legacy of this unstable founda-
tion is that the Court's prosecutor and judges are struggling to determine
which cases are sufficiently grave for admissibility. The Court's very first
case revealed divergent views among the judges about the institution's mis-
sion. In deciding the admissibility of the Lubanga case, the judges of the
Pre-Trial Chamber held that the gravity threshold requires widespread or
systematic crimes and high-level defendants with the greatest responsibility
for those crimes.91 In other words, they sided with the states that had wanted
to restrict the Court's reach in the negotiations of the Rome Statute. The
Appeals Chamber judges disagreed, however, stating that the lower court's
interpretation contravened the language of the statute and undermined the
goal of deterrence.92 Although the majority opinion offered no interpretation
of the gravity requirement, one judge wrote separately to give his view that
the threshold should be set very low, excluding only very insignificant
crimes.93 A similar issue arose in the context of whether to authorize inves-
tigation in the situation involving post-election violence in Kenya. In that
situation, the judges disagreed about whether the crimes were sufficiently
serious to merit ICC action.94
The Court's prosecutor has also failed to articulate a coherent under-
standing of the gravity threshold for admissibility. The prosecutor declined
89. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1735.
90. See id. at 1735-36.
91. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning
Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into
the Record of the Case Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, annex 1, 46, 50 (Feb. 24,
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.PDF
92. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169,
Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I, 9T 69-79
(July 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 1 83559.pdf.
93. Id. 1 39-40 (Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Pikis, J.) (stating that the
threshold should exclude only cases "unworthy of consideration by the Court").
94. Compare Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursu-
ant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, H1 198-200 (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf (holding that the high-ranking nature of alleged perpetrators and
the number of burned houses, deaths, and displaced people resulting from violence as well as
elements of brutality, such as burning victims alive, satisfied the gravity threshold), with id.
919 150-53 (Dissenting Opinion of Kaul, J.) (asserting that because violence lacked requisite
organization and that there was no evidence that violence was sponsored by the state, the situ-
ation did not meet the requirements of crimes against humanity).
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to open an investigation into alleged British war crimes in Iraq on the
grounds that the gravity threshold was not met in light of the low number of
victims-"4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a limited number of victims
of inhumane treatment."95 The prosecutor noted that the number of victims
alleged in Iraq was "of a different order" from the other situations before the
Court, each of which involves thousands of deaths. 96 Nonetheless, the pros-
ecutor has since announced that he is conducting a preliminary examination
of war crimes allegedly committed by North Korean forces that also involve
a relatively low number of victims-approximately fifty people killed. 9 In
sum, the question of what situations and cases are "major" enough for ICC
adjudication remains contested, even among the Court's prosecutor and
judges.
The final reason to reject the claim that the ICC enjoys substantial pur-
posive legitimacy based on its mission to prosecute "major" crimes is that
there is no agreement, either among the states parties, or even among those
running the tribunal, about what makes some crimes more "major" than oth-
ers such that they should be given priority in allocating the Court's scarce
resources. It is widely accepted that international criminal courts should
adjudicate the most serious cases available to them.98 The Nuremberg Char-
ter limited that tribunal's mandate to the "major war criminals" of the Axis
countries.99 Although the statutes of the subsequent international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not include such a limi-
tation, the ICTY's first prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, learned the hard way
that such a policy was expected of him. Under heavy pressure to get the
95. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, to The Hague
(Feb. 9, 2006), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596DO8D-D810-43A2-99BB-B899B9
C5BCD2/277422/OTPletter to senders reIraq_9 February_2006.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Press Release, ICC OTP, ICC Prosecutor: Alleged War Crimes in the Territory of
the Republic of Korea Under Preliminary Examination, ICC-CPI-20101206-PR608 (June 12,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20
releases %20(2010)/pr608?lan=en-GB.
98. Rod Rastan, Comment on Victor's Justice & the Viability of Ex Ante Standards, 43
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 569, 590 (2010); see also Sloane, supra note 5, at 50. But see Jose E.
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
470-71 (1999) (arguing that trials should reflect the reality that a "wide variety of people" are
complicit in atrocities).
99. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. Decisions about which defendants fit this description were explicitly political.
See, e.g., MICHAEL SALTER, NAZI WAR CRIMES, US INTELLIGENCE AND SELECTIVE PROSECU-
TIONS AT NUREMBERG, CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES 244-45 (2007) (discussing placement of U.S. intelligence agents in the highest lev-
els of the Nuremberg prosecution team to ensure high-ranking Nazis who collaborated with
the United States at the end of the war were not prosecuted); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING
JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 64 (1977) (stating that the Americans selected defendants "not
because of their personal actions, cruelty, or notoriety, but because they fitted into the Ameri-
can plan for prosecuting organizations").
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tribunal up and running, 100 Goldstone adopted a strategy of using lower-level
perpetrators to build cases against those with greater responsibility."0 The
ICTY judges immediately condemned this approach, telling Goldstone he
should focus exclusively on the most serious cases. 10 2 They even issued a
public statement saying they did not feel his strategy would "effectively
meet the expectations of the Security Council and of the world community
at large." 103 Eventually, when the Security Council began pressing the two
tribunals to complete their work' ° the tribunals' rules were changed to ena-
ble the judges to refer cases that do not involve leaders with responsibility
for very serious crimes to national authorities.' 5
The ICC prosecutor, mindful of the expectation that he select the most
serious situations and cases for investigation and prosecution, has made
gravity central to his selection policies.106 In fact, Moreno-Ocampo some-
times conflates the gravity threshold for admissibility discussed above with
his discretionary invocations of gravity to justify selecting particular situa-
tions and cases from among all of those that appear admissible.10 7 In other
words, he implies that he has selected particular situations and cases be-
100. Richard Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
277, 281 (2002) (recalling that Goldstone was told that if he did not indict someone within a
few months of his arrival, the tribunal would have no money the following year).
101. Antonio Cassese, The ICTY. A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 585,
586 (2004).
102. See id. at 586-87.
103. Press Release, ICTY, The Judges of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Express
Their Concern Regarding the Substance of Their Programme of Judicial Work for 1995, U.N.
Press Release CC/PIO/003-E (Feb. 1, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7251.
104. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1503, 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (request-
ing the tribunals to complete all trial activities and implement completion strategies).
105. See ICTY R. P. & EvID. lIbis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008); ICTR R.
P. & Evlo. 1lbis (Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English/
LegalIROP/100209.pdf. Some subsequent international tribunals have included such a limita-
tion on their jurisdictions as well. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established "to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law."
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Estab-
lishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, appended to letter dated Mar. 6, 2002 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246
(Jan. 16 2002). The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were established to
"bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible
for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law
and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979." Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct
27, 2004), art. 1, available at http://www.eccc.gov.khlsites/defaultlfilesllegal-documents/
KRLaw as amended_27_Oct2004_Eng.pdf.
106. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15, at 4-6; DRAFT
POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, TT 7, 9, 67-72.
107. deGuzman, supra note 11, at 1429.
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cause they are the most serious as if that were a requirement of the Rome
Statute. 108 In fact, the statute only requires that the cases be serious enough
for jurisdiction and his use of relative gravity to justify selection is purely an
exercise of his discretion. This conflation is perhaps intentional. Moreno-
Ocampo may be seeking to root his selections in the requirements of the
statute rather than his own judgment to enhance perceptions that those deci-
sions are legitimate.
Moreno-Ocampo thus uses the concept of gravity to explain the correct-
ness of his selection decisions and even to suggest their inevitability. In fact,
in October 2010, Moreno-Ocampo issued a draft policy paper with regard to
the initiation of investigations where he implicitly takes the position that he
does not "select" situations at all, but rather is constrained to pursue all situ-
ations that meet the criteria for jurisdiction and admissibility before the
Court. Whereas a 2006 draft policy had been titled "Criteria for Selection of
Situations and Cases,"'( 9 the new proposed policy is called "Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations."' " While the earlier draft announced a policy of
addressing "serious situations," the 2010 version states that the prosecutor is
"obliged" to conduct a preliminary examination until he is able to determine
whether a reasonable basis to investigate exists."' The unstated assumption
seems to be that the prosecutor must pursue all situations that meet the rea-
sonable basis test and may not, therefore, reject a situation based on the
relatively low gravity of the preliminary information received.
On the other hand, the prosecutor's current policy regarding case selec-
tion (also still in draft form) acknowledges that the prosecutor selects among
cases that meet the admissibility threshold and announces the prosecutor's
priorities largely in terms of gravity. The case selection policy indicates that
the prosecutor's office will focus its resources on "particularly serious cas-
es.,," 2 It further states that it will give priority to prosecuting "persons most
responsible for the most serious crimes," while seeking to maximize the
ICC's preventive impact." 3 The policy states that this emphasis on those
most responsible will generally entail selecting cases against high-ranking
leaders,"' and lays out four factors to be considered in assessing gravity:
108. Id.
109. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15.
110. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15. "Prelimi-
nary examination" is the term the OTP has adopted for the stage where it considers whether to
open an investigation. See id. 4-5, 12-14.
111. Compare DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15, at 9
with DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, T 83.
112. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15, at 9.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. at 13 ("[I]nvestigation may go wider than high-ranking officers if, for example,
investigation of certain types of crimes or those officers lower down the chain of command is
necessary for the whole case.").
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(1) the scale of the crimes; (2) the nature of the crimes; (3) the manner of
commission of the crimes; and (4) the impact of the crimes.15
Some scholars support the prosecutor's emphasis on gravity as the pri-
mary basis for his selection decisions. For example, Professors Stephanos
Bibas and William Burke-White write that international courts should "fo-
cus on the most intentional and flagrant crimes that caused the gravest harm
to the most victims and sowed the most widespread grief and bitterness.""'16
By picking "a handful of strong cases involving the worst crimes," interna-
tional courts can "maximize public satisfaction and historic resolution."
1'1 7
What these authors overlook is that there is no agreement on which cases
cause "the gravest harm" or involve "the worst crimes."'18 As the prosecu-
tor's policy acknowledges, harm can be measured along various dimensions:
extent of harm to individual victims, number of victims affected, broader
impact on the community, and so forth. One person may feel that it is
"worse" to inflict great suffering on a single victim, while another is more
outraged by a crime that harms many people to a lesser extent. Similarly,
some may view an attempted crime that harms no one but threatened sub-
stantial harm as more grave than a completed crime that harms a great
number but only slightly. Seriousness of harm, in other words, is incom-
mensurable and therefore provides an inadequate justification for selection
decisions.
In sum, the concept of gravity served a constructive role in the estab-
lishment of the Court, providing a stand-in for agreement on more precise
goals. The inclusion of gravity as a threshold for admissibility, along with
the multiple references to seriousness in the descriptions of the Court's ju-
risdiction, enabled state and nonstate actors to believe that the Court would
act in accordance with their visions of its appropriate role. Those who want-
ed the Court's work to be limited to situations like the Holocaust, ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and genocide in Rwanda could believe
that "sufficient gravity" referred to those kinds of situations." 9 Those who
saw the Court as being able to intervene more frequently when states are not
adequately protecting people could interpret gravity as a much lower thresh-
115. Id. at 5. See also ICC, REGULATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, reg.
29 (Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter OTP REGULATIONS], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/FFF971 Il-ECD6-40B5-9CDA-792BCBEI E695/280253/ICCBDO50109 ENG.pdf
(listing the same factors for assessing gravity in the regulations of the OTP).
116. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 71, at 681.
117. Id. at 681-82.
118. Id. at 681. See deGuzman, supra note 11, at 1424-27 (noting that legislative history
of the Rome Statute reveals little about the precise content or definition of "gravity"); see also
Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 19 CRIM. L.F. 35, 40-42 (2008).
119. Cf Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 26 (1999) (noting some countries, including the United States, wanted
the ICC's automatic jurisdiction to be limited to genocide).
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old. 120 However, gravity's imprecision has become problematic as the
Court's prosecutor and judges seek to implement the Court's mandate to
prosecute "the most serious crimes of concern to the international communi-
ty. "''2 Gravity simply does not have enough agreed content to provide
convincing justifications for selection decisions. To establish its purposive
legitimacy, the Court needs greater agreement around actual goals and prior-
ities. Otherwise, its selection decisions will continue to be attacked as
'political" or simply incoherent.
II. GOOD PROCESS Is NOT ENOUGH
Considerable scholarly and advocacy attention has focused on the
problem of selectivity at the ICC, and several scholars have identified se-
lectivity as a threat to the ICC's legitimacy.2 2 However, this Article is the
120. The use of a gravity threshold to mask differences among negotiating parties was
also evident in the post-Rome discussions surrounding the definition of aggression. For exam-
ple, during the Sixth Session of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, there
was a dispute on whether the list of actions in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXIX) should serve as an illustrative or exhaustive list of "acts of aggression" for the pur-
poses of the definition. Concern was expressed that not all of the acts listed in the resolution
were sufficiently serious for the purposes of the ICC. Rep. of the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, 6th Session, Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, 18-23. Rather than resolve
this dispute outright, it was observed that "the inclusion of the threshold clause [was] all the
more important." Id. % 23.
121. Id. 23 (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.).
122. See, e.g., CRYER, supra note 14, at 192; AVRIL McDONALD & ROELOF HAVEMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION-SOME THOUGHTS ON 'OBJECTIFYING' THE EXERCISE OF PROS-
ECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 2-3 (2003), available at http://
www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/McDonald-Havemanissues-relevant.pdf (explaining the im-
portance of "objectifying" prosecutorial discretion); James F. Alexander, The International
Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2009) (discussing legitimacy problems faced by the ICC); Brubacher, supra note
5, at 72, 74 (stating that the success of the ICC hinges in part on how the prosecutor exercises
his discretion); Luc C6t6, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 162, 168, 171, 177 (2005) (discussing legitimacy
of prosecutorial discretion in light of political efforts during peace negotiations); Allison
Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at
the International Criminal Court, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 510, 535-37 (2003) (arguing lack of
objective standards for selection undermines the prosecutor's legitimacy); Jingbo Dong, Pros-
ecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Study, 2 J. POL. & L.
109, 113 (2009) (studying the ICC prosecutor and determining prosecutorial discretion needs
to be adjusted to "reach coherence"); Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual
Punishment, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 593 (2005) (arguing that selectivity undermines the abil-
ity of international tribunals to achieve their various goals); Goldston, supra note 4, at 402-05
(considering the possibility that the OTP will develop and publish flexible guidelines that
make selection more transparent); Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 586-88 (observing problems
selectivity creates for the ICC's legitimacy); Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 50, at 124 (asserting
that prosecutors must properly exercise discretion and mechanisms for prosecutorial account-
ability must be established); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against
Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1821 n.321 (2005) (noting the inability of interna-
tional courts to indict leaders of major world powers creates legitimacy problems); Schabas,
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first to argue that ICC selection decisions will tend to undermine the Court's
legitimacy unless they are rooted in goals and priorities that are acceptable
to relevant audiences. Instead of focusing on the substantive justifications
for selection decisions, most commentators, as well as current ICC prosecu-
tor Moreno-Ocampo, maintain that selection decisions that follow good
process will enhance the ICC's legitimacy. Good process in this context is
usually thought to include adhering to such principles as independence, im-
partiality, objectivity, and transparency in making selections. 23 For example,
in a widely cited article, Allison Marston Danner argued that prosecutorial
decisions will be both actually legitimate and perceived as such if they are
taken in a principled, reasoned, and impartial manner. 124 Similarly, David
Luban has written that the legitimacy of international courts stems from "the
manifested fairness of their procedures and punishments."' 125 Moreno-
Ocampo has adopted this approach, articulating a policy of adherence to the
principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity, and transparency.1
2 6
supra note 27, at 740, 749 (asserting the prosecutor's selection decisions are not aligned with
the purported criteria of "gravity" and "interests of justice"); Carsten Stahn, Judicial Review of
Prosecutorial Discretion: On Experiments and Imperfections, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 239, 240, 242-43 (G. Sluiter & S. Vasiliev
eds., 2009). Commentators have also discussed the problem of selectivity for the legitimacy of
other international criminal courts. See, e.g., Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14
U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 135 (2009) (discussing perceived legitimacy of the
ICC in Congo); Marieke Wierda et al., Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and
Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1065, 1069, 1072-73
(2007) (claiming that the selective nature of the Lebanon tribunal undermines its legitimacy).
123. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SELECTION OF SITUATIONS AND CASES
FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4-5 (2006), available
at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/26/selection-situations-and-cases-trial-international-
criminal-court; MCDONALD & HAVEMAN, supra note 122, at 3, 9 (noting the need for objec-
tive criteria on investigation, admissibility, and prosecution of cases); Danner, supra note 122,
at 511 (emphasizing the importance of transparency); Brian Lepard, How Should the ICC
Prosecutor Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 553, 558-63, 564, 566-67 (2010) (arguing the ICC prosecutor should use
fundamental ethical principles to guide selection decisions).
124. Danner, supra note 122, at 536-37.
125. Luban, supra note 18, at 579; see also Lepard, supra note 123, at 566-67 (arguing
that the prosecutor should adhere to "fundamental ethical principles" including independence
and impartiality).
126. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, 15, 33;
see also OTP REGULATIONS, supra note 115, regs. 13, 24, 28(l)-(2); OTP, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS (JUNE 2003-JUNE 2006) 24 (2006)
[hereinafter REPORT ON FIRST THREE YEARS], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/70CB 178C- 15C7-4BDB-BO9E-9E93CEFOE 165/143610/3yearreport2006O914_
English.pdf (noting that the OTP developed standard operating procedures that address several
subjects, including "impartial investigation"); Press Release, ICC OTP, Statement by the Pros-
ecutor Related to Crimes Committed in Barlonya Camp in Uganda, Int'l Crim. Ct. Press
Release pids.002.2004-EN (Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/
asp-docs/library/organs/otp/PIDS.OTP.002.2004-EN2.pdf (affirming that the investigation "will
be carried out in an independent and impartial way"); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC,
Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants 2 (Oct. 14, 2005), available at
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Although good process is undoubtedly important to the ICC's legitima-
cy, adherence to principles of good decision making cannot enhance such
legitimacy in the absence of agreed goals and priorities for ICC action. Prin-
cipled decision making is by definition impossible without principles.
Moreover, transparency may actually exacerbate perceptions of illegitimacy
by exposing the incoherence underlying selection decisions.
A. Independence
The idea that international prosecutors should act independently is en-
shrined in the constitutive documents of most international criminal law
institutions. 127 The Rome Statute provides that the prosecutor "shall act in-
dependently as a separate organ of the Court," and "shall not seek or act on
instructions from any external source."128 Moreno-Ocampo's interpretation
of the principle goes even further, stating that his office's decisions "shall
not be altered by the presumed or known wishes of any party or by the co-
operation seeking process." '129 In particular, the prosecutor makes frequent
statements claiming that his selection decisions are not influenced by the
wishes of political actors. 130
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/AFI 69689-AFC9-4 1B9-8A3E-222F07DA42AD/1 43834/
LMO_20051014_Englishl .pdf (reporting that the OTP had informed Ugandan authorities that
the investigation would be impartial); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at the
Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs 6 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Prosecutor Statement of Oct. 24], available at http://www.icc-cpi.intlNRfrdonlyres/
9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_English.pdf ("Case
selection is carried out through careful analysis based on the principles of objectivity and
impartiality....").
127. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 62, art. 16(2) ("The Prosecutor shall act inde-
pendently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive
instructions from any Government or from any other source."); ICTR Statute, supra note 62,
art. 15(2) ("The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or
from any other source."). The Nuremberg Charter, on the other hand, contained no such limita-
tion, and decisions about who to prosecute were made with explicit input from political actors.
Cf SALTER, supra note 99, at 125 (noting that the United States government had intelligence
agents in the highest levels of the staff of the U.S. prosecutor to ensure that high-level Nazi
officials who had collaborated with the United States at the end of the war were not prosecut-
ed).
128. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 42; see also OTP Regulations, supra note 115, reg.
13 (stating that prosecutors will "maintain their full independence" and will not "seek or act
on instructions from any external source").
129. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, 34.
130. Moreno-Ocampo's keynote address provides an example of his rhetoric regarding
political independence of decision making. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 4, at 6. Despite
such statements, WikiLeaks disclosed a U.S. diplomatic cable asserting that Moreno-Ocampo
privately told diplomats that he did not want to investigate British war crimes in Iraq. Afua
Hirsch, WikiLeaks Cables Lay Bare U.S. Hostility to International Criminal Court, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2OlO/dec/17/wikileaks-
us-international-criminal-court.
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A number of commentators assert that such independence from political
influence is crucial to the Court's legitimacy.1 3 1 However, others argue that it
is inappropriate and perhaps even impossible for the ICC to adhere to such a
strict standard of independence from the political actors who created and
sustain the institution. 132 The idea that the prosecutor can act completely
independently is particularly problematic for the ICC in light of the failure
of its creators to endow the Court with clear goals and priorities. In fact,
previous international tribunals, although their missions were limited to par-
ticular situations, have not adhered to such narrow interpretations of the
independence requirement. For example, the ICTY has held that the prose-
cutor's independence does not preclude the prosecutor from heeding the
"urging" of the Security Council to investigate particular allegations of
criminal conduct.'33 According to the Milo~evi6 trial chamber, such encour-
agement is "no different from a government in a domestic jurisdiction
setting a prosecutorial policy." '134 Although some national systems reject the
notion of political involvement in setting prosecutorial priorities, 5 the prac-
tice is arguably more appropriate at the international level where greater
disagreement exists about which cases most merit adjudication. 36 Moreover,
since the views of state actors are critical to the work and even survival of
the Court, the institution ignores their preferences at its peril.
Certainly, political actors should not be allowed to use the Court to fur-
ther self-interested objectives such as increasing their power at the expense
of rivals. Some authors have questioned the legitimacy of the "self-referrals"
that three governments have made on that basis.'37 However, when political
actors are simply seeking to encourage the Court to advance particular goals
or priorities, there is no reason the Court should ignore their views. Indeed,
131. See, e.g., Jerry Fowler, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A
Framework of International Justice for Future Generations, 6 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 20 (1998)
(claiming that danger of political decision making is averted by the Rome Statute's require-
ments of an independent prosecutor under judicial supervision and strict jurisdictional
provisions).
132. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 587-88 and accompanying text.
133. Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 15
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
slobodanmilosevic/tdec/en/l 110873516829.htm. However, commentators have suggested
that the Security Council's decision to urge the prosecutor to collect evidence relating to the
Kosovo conflict called into question the impartiality and independence of the tribunal. See
CRYER, supra note 14, 213-14 ("[T]he fact that three powerful NATO States, which by that
time were heavily involved in the Kosovo conflict, are permanent members of the Security
Council, raises the question of whether the Council ought to have attempted to set prosecuto-
rial policy.").
134. Miloevi, Case No. IT-02-54 (ICTY), 15.
135. See Ntanda Nsereko, supra note 50, at 129.
136. See supra Part I for a discussion of the controversy and debate surrounding selec-
tions decisions at the ICC.
137. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 27, at 751-52 (discussing Uganda's use of ICC self-
referral to put political pressure on the Lord's Resistance Army).
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as a number of commentators have suggested, greater involvement by politi-
cal bodies in ICC selection decisions may be important for the institution's
legitimacy and long-term survival. 3 '
B. Impartiality
The principle of impartiality is similarly unhelpful in promoting the
legitimacy of ICC selection decisions in the absence of guiding goals and
principles. The current prosecutor has interpreted the requirement of im-
partiality to mean two things: that he cannot discriminate on prohibited
grounds; and that he must "apply consistent methods and criteria irrespec-
tive of the State or parties or the person(s) or group(s) concerned."'39 As
such, the prosecutor contends that consideration of geopolitical factors,
geographic balance, and parity between rival parties is not appropriate in
selecting situations.
140
The idea that the prosecutor should not engage in discrimination on
grounds such as group membership when selecting cases and situations
seems uncontroversial at first blush. The principle that all people are equal
before the law is a well-established norm of human rights law.14 1 In national
systems, many commentators consider it inappropriate for prosecutors to
decide not to prosecute particular classes of offenders. 142 In international
criminal law, however, the notion of nondiscrimination is complicated by
138. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 154-56 (observing potential benefits, in-
cluding increased legitimacy, of greater Security Council involvement in ICC prosecutorial
decisions); Schabas, supra note 2, at 550-51. In preparation for the ICC Review Conference
in 2010, the African Union circulated a "Concept Note" suggesting that the Assembly of
States Parties adopt guidelines that the prosecutor is obligated to consider in making selection
decisions. See Goldston, supra note 4, at 404-05 (citing AFRICAN UNION, CONCEPT NOTE FOR
THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF MINISTERS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT § 21 (2009)). As one author has noted, when the Security Council refers a
situation to the Court based on the Council's assessment that prosecution is a necessary meas-
ure to secure or restore peace and security, it is arguably inappropriate for the prosecutor or
judges to have discretion to reject the situation. See Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, &
Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 185, 194-95 (Carten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
139. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, $ 38.
140. Id. M 38-40. The prosecutor has noted that "impartiality does not mean 'equiva-
lence of blame' within a situation," id. $ 40, and he has promised to elaborate on the matter in
a forthcoming paper on case selection.
141. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 14(1), 26,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (lII) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), arts. 1, 7 (Dec. 10, 1948).
142. CRYER, supra note 14, at 196 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,
in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 218 (1977)); see also Unit-
ed States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that, due to the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, "the decision whether to prosecute
may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classi-
fication' ") (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
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the high degree of selectivity required. At those courts, selecting defendants
in part based on their membership in rival groups-and thereby deselecting
others based on the same criterion-may be necessary to achieve the goal of
fostering peace and security.14 3 When the Security Council creates an ad hoc
tribunal or refers a situation to the ICC, such action hinges on the determi-
nation that international investigation and prosecution will foster peace and
security.' 44 Some commentators, including prominent human rights advo-
cates, maintain that prosecuting only one side of a conflict undermines the
prospects for lasting peace, particularly when the conflict involved rival
groups defined in terms of such characteristics as race, religion, and ethnici-
ty. 145 In an apparent effort to advance peace and reconciliation, international
prosecutors have sometimes selected defendants in part based on their group
affiliation. 146 The ICTY, for example, has prosecuted mostly Serb defendants
but has also selected some Muslims and Croats for prosecution. Nonethe-
less, when defendants have claimed that their prosecution violated the
principle of equality, they have been uniformly rebuffed by the courts.1 47 For
example, the ICTY rejected the claim of defendant Vojislav Seselj that he
was selected for prosecution because he was Serb, writing that "persons
from all relevant different ethnic backgrounds have been and are being pros-
ecuted.''48 The implication of this statement seems to be that the tribunal
might consider the matter differently if only Serbs were being prosecuted.
Nonetheless, defendants at the ICTR have had no greater success with
claims of selective prosecution, even though the ICTR has prosecuted only
143. Rome Statute, supra note 6, pmbl.; see also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
144. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
145. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, the ICTR's failure to prosecute
Tutsi perpetrators has led some Rwandans to view that tribunal as an instrument of "victor's
justice," undermining the tribunal's ability to contribute to national reconciliation and the
maintenance of peace. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MAKING KAMPALA COUNT: ADVANCING THE
GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY AT THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE 65-66 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij05 10webwcover.pdf.
146. One commentator has also suggested that the ICC prosecutor took ethnicity into
account in deciding which defendants to prosecute in the Congo. Goldston, supra note 4, at
401 (citing A. Hochschild, The Trial of Thomas Lubanga, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2009, at 4).
147. In deciding claims based on the principle of equality, courts have generally found
that defendants failed to establish the required discriminatory motive as long as there was a
basis for their selection other than their racial or ethnic identity. Thus, in the Celebici case, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected defendant Landio's claim that he had been improperly se-
lected for prosecution because he was Muslim in order to give an appearance of
evenhandedness to the prosecutor's selection policy. The Chamber held that the selection was
motivated by the seriousness of the defendant's crimes rather than his identity. Prosecutor v.
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, t 612-14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via Feb. 20, 2001).
148. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion by Vojislav Seselj
Challenging Jurisdiction and Form of Indictment, 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia May 26, 2004).
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Hutu defendants.149 In fact, an ICTR trial chamber stated explicitly that
prosecution of only one ethnic group does not necessarily violate the princi-
ple of equality, and thus rejected a claim of selective prosecution in part on
the grounds that it was within the prosecutor's discretion to focus exclusive-
ly on persons who participated in the genocide against Tutsis. "o
In sum, international criminal law jurisprudence to date suggests that in-
ternational prosecutors do not violate their obligation of nondiscrimination
when they select defendants in part based on their affiliation with a particu-
lar group. The principle of nondiscrimination thus does little to address the
problem of ICC selectivity.
The prosecutor's second claim-that his decisions are constrained by
the impartiality-based requirement of applying consistent "methods and cri-
teria"-also fails adequately to address selectivity. The prosecutor is not
alone in endorsing this approach; several commentators, including Danner,
have argued that the adoption of selection criteria will enhance the ICC's
legitimacy.'5 1 Applying consistent methods and criteria to selection deci-
sions is unlikely to advance the Court's legitimacy, however, because those
criteria are not currently tied to accepted goals and priorities. For example,
the prosecutor's four gravity factors-scale, nature, manner of commission,
and impact of crimes-cannot be consistently applied as he suggests. In-
stead, in light of the volume of comparisons being made, some factors must
be privileged over others, leading to disparate results. If the prosecutor em-
phasizes the scale of the crimes, he can justify prosecuting widespread
illegal detention rather than more limited instances of rape or torture. He can
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR-2000-56-T, Decision on De-
fense Motions for Stay of Proceedings and for Adjournment of the Trial, 26 (Sep. 24, 2004)
(holding that the defense's examples in support of its selective prosecution claim were
"insufficient to substantiate any charge so grave against the Prosecutor"); Prosecutor v.
Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-56-I, Decision on Urgent Oral Motion for a Stay of the
Indictment, or in the Alternative a Reference to the Security Council, 26 (Mar. 26, 2004)
("[T]he Chamber finds that the Defence has not adduced any evidence of the Prosecution's
alleged impermissible discriminatory motives-besides the general allegation that the
Prosecution has acted politically-to satisfy the high burden required to show abuse of
prosecutorial discretion."); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-
17-T, Judgment and Sentence, T 871 (Feb. 21, 2003) (rejecting selective prosecution claim on
grounds that defendant failed to adduce any evidence that prosecutor acted with discriminato-
ry motive); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 96 (June 1, 2001)
("Assuming that the Prosecutor pursues a discriminatory prosecutorial policy, Akayesu has
failed to show any causal relationship between such a policy and the alleged partiality of the
Tribunal.").
150. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph Nzirorera's
Motion for Selective Prosecution Documents, 17, 19 (Sept. 30, 2009).
151. Danner, supra note 122, at 534-50; see also Goldston, supra note 4, at 402-05
(noting a need for the OTP to develop its own set of guidelines for case and situation selec-
tion); Rastan, supra note 98, at 593 (arguing ex ante standards are important for the
transparency they provide); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not to Proceed
In the "Interests of Justice," 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305, 324 (2005) (arguing for ex ante standards in
evaluating the "interests of justice").
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reach the opposite result by highlighting the nature of the crimes, since rape
and torture are generally considered more serious than illegal detention.
Similarly, he can stress the manner of commission of crimes to select a small
number of particularly brutal killings over large-scale persecution although
the impact of the crimes might be much more severe for the latter.
In fact, due to the malleability of the factor-based approach to assessing
gravity as well as the "interests of justice," a claim that the prosecutor ad-
heres to ex ante standards for selection decisions may actually undermine
the Court's efforts to build legitimacy. When selection decisions are patently
inconsistent, presenting them as the result of the application of ex ante
standards may appear disingenuous. Thus, by purporting to follow unchang-
ing criteria rather than admitting the policy choices he faces, the prosecutor
may actually detract from the Court's legitimacy, strengthening accusations
of improper political influence and even "victor's justice." '152
C. Objectivity
Another principle that the current prosecutor and a number of commen-
tators invoke to bolster the legitimacy of selection decisions is that of
objectivity.' Like independence and impartiality, however, objectivity can-
not solve the problem of selectivity. First, in the absence of agreed goals and
priorities there is simply no way of applying such vague concepts as gravity
or the interests of justice objectively. 5 4 For example, Human Rights Watch,
a leading NGO in international criminal law advocacy, takes the position
that the "interests of justice" provision does not allow the prosecutor to de-
cline to initiate an investigation on the grounds that the national government
is addressing crimes through alternatives to prosecution such as truth com-
missions or traditional reconciliation methods.'55 Others assert that deferring
to such processes is precisely the reason for the inclusion of the interests of
justice provision. 5 6 Similarly, with regard to gravity, Human Rights Watch
suggests that the prosecutor should use "objective criteria" to decide wheth-
152. See Schabas, supra note 2, at 551-52.
153. See Prosecutor Statement of Oct. 24, supra note 126, at 6 ("Case selection is carried
out through careful analysis based on the principles of objectivity and impartiality.
MCDONALD & HAVEMAN, supra note 122, at 3, 9.
154. Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L.F.
281, 292 (2006) (noting the criteria of "gravity" and "interests of victims" have been "charac-
terized by vagueness" and that the prosecutor has broad discretion especially in choosing
whether to prosecute a case).
155. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE MEANING OF "THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE" IN ARTI-
CLE 53 OF THE ROME STATUTE 2 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/
docs/ij070505.pdf.
156. See Robinson, supra note 83, 498-502 (discussing the complementarity principle
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute); see also Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, 'In the
Interests of Justice'and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers,




er a case merits prosecution and, if the threshold for prosecution is met,
should bring the case "even if the scale of the underlying crimes is not of the
same magnitude as those of other defendants before the ICC."' '57 As ex-
plained above, however, there is no "objective" way to determine the gravity
of potential cases. The prosecutor might have a better claim to objectivity if,
as Christoper Hall of Amnesty International suggests, he disregards the
gravity threshold and simply prosecutes all cases involving international
crimes.158 However, such a prosecutorial policy is impracticable in light of
the Court's very limited resources.
Moreover, the adoption of ex ante criteria may be inappropriate
because, as Alexander Greenawalt has argued, decisions about which cases
and situations to pursue may simply be unsusceptible to rule-based deci-
sion making.'59 Each situation presents such a complex mix of relevant
circumstances that application of rigid criteria may be impossible and is
probably undesirable." 6
Finally, by claiming that such fraught concepts as gravity can be applied
"objectively," persons making selection decisions may actually become more
wedded to their personal understandings of the Court's role and less able to
contribute to a productive dialogue on the subject. As one author has noted, to
reach optimal decisions, the prosecutor should engage in "open-minded
consultation."16' Empirical studies suggest that such open mindedness is
impaired when a decision maker is asked to behave objectively. 62 Addition-
ally, the claim that selection decisions have been reached "objectively" may
aggravate charges of illegitimacy by persons who disagree with the goals
being pursued and thus reject claims that the decisions are objectively cor-
rect. 163
157. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 123, at 5.
158. Christopher K. Hall, Danger of Selective Justice: All Cases Involving Crimes
Under International Law Should Be Investigated and the Suspects, When There Is Sufficient
Admissible Evidence, Prosecuted, in CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND SELECTING CORE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 123, 125 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2009), available at http://
www.prio.no/upload/FICHL/090326%20FICHL%20Publication%20Series%2ONo.%204
%20(2009)%20(criteria).pdf.
159. Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 654-55.
160. As Greenawalt points out, advocates of the public criterion approach generally fail
to provide concrete bases on which decisions should be made. Id. at 655.
161. Lepard, supra note 123, at 564.
162. Cf Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduc-
es Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, 93 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 415, 428 (2007) (discussing implications of study showing people instructed to act
objectively or rationally were less effective at debiasing than "the combination of identity
salience and affirmation").
163. I am indebted to David Hoffman for suggesting this potential problem with claims
of objective decision making.
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D. Transparency
Finally, a mantra of those seeking to increase the ICC's legitimacy is
that decisions should be made transparently. For that reason, Danner and
others have stressed the need for the ICC prosecutor to adopt public guide-
lines for selection decisions."6 Professor Brian Lepard has written that
transparency "naturally helps to build and sustain political trust of the Court
and enhance its legitimacy." '165 Such openness can alleviate suspicions that
the prosecutor is politically motivated. 66 Professor Philippa Webb has ar-
gued that the adoption of public criteria for prosecutorial selection decisions
"would improve the ICC Prosecutor's relations with the outside world" and
a failure to follow public criteria will damage the prosecutor's credibility.
1 67
Moreno-Ocampo has heeded such admonitions and, unlike the prosecutors
of other international courts, has circulated policy papers explaining the cri-
teria his office uses for selection decisions.
168
Transparency in selection decisions is indeed important, but not for the
reasons these commentators suggest. The argument that transparency inher-
ently enhances legitimacy is flawed. In fact, the contrary may be true.
Transparency enhances legitimacy when it exposes good process, but may
undermine legitimacy when it reveals incoherence. Since the ICC lacks
agreed goals and priorities, articulating "criteria" or "guidelines" for selec-
tions may simply highlight the inconsistent manner in which such decisions
are made. For example, the ICC has articulated gravity as a key element in
decision making.169 Yet, as explained above, 70 there seems to be little basis
in gravity to explain the prosecutor's decision to decline investigation of
alleged British war crimes in Iraq, but pursue those allegedly committed by
164. Danner, supra note 122, at 546-47; see also Rastan, supra note 98, at 593 (noting
that the value of ex ante standards lies partly in the promotion of external transparency); Su-
sana SdCouto & Katherine A. Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal
Court, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 807, 813-14 (2008) (noting public trust in the ICC would
increase if the prosecutor clearly communicated the role of gravity in both admissibility and
selection of cases).
165. Lepard, supra note 123, at 564.
166. Id. at 565.
167. Webb, supra note 151, at 324.
168. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15; DRAFT POLICY
PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 15, at 5. The prosecutors of other interna-
tional tribunals have been criticized for failing to issue public criteria, See, e.g., C6t, supra
note 122, at 171-72 ("It is difficult to understand why the Prosecutors of the ICTR and ICTY,
both institutions being confronted with credibility problems in their specific regions, failed to
adopt public regulations stating the criteria used in the general exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.") (footnotes omitted).
169. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 11, at 1400 ("The concept of gravity or seriousness
resides at the epicenter of the legal regime of the International Criminal Court .... ). In addi-
tion, the Rome Statute only provides jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes," and
mandates judges reject admissibility of a case that is not of sufficient gravity. Rome Statute,
supra note 6, arts. 5, 17.
170. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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North Korean forces that also affected a relatively small number of victims.
Such decisions thus appear pejoratively "political"-the prosecutor seems to
be currying favor with powerful states. The claim that the decisions were
reached through the application of ex ante criteria sounds insincere or even
disingenuous. Transparency without goals may therefore harm the ICC's
legitimacy.17
1
On the other hand, transparency can serve a legitimating function if it
exposes to public discourse the decision makers' understanding of the ap-
propriate goals and priorities for the institution. Unless the states parties
amend the statute or otherwise impose on the Court's decision makers goals
and priorities to guide their selections, it will remain up to the prosecutor
and, to a lesser extent, the judges to seek to develop greater consensus
around the ICC's purposes. As described more fully below, 72 the Court's
decision makers can foster such consensus by announcing their visions of
the Court's role, testing it against the reactions of relevant audiences, and
using such reactions to inform future selection decisions. If selection deci-
sion makers adopt the expressive agenda advocated below, transparency will
be a critical component of norm promulgation and will facilitate the dialogic
process of identifying the appropriate norms for ICC expression.
In sum, efforts to enhance the Court's legitimacy through good process
cannot succeed in the absence of goals and priorities that relevant audiences
accept as appropriate for the Court. It is critical therefore that supporters of
the ICC turn their attention to the task of identifying such goals and priori-
ties. The next Part examines each of the primary goals advanced for the ICC
and makes the case for the ICC to focus its efforts on the expression of
global norms.
11. THEORIZING SELECTION DECISIONS
Thus far, this Article has sought both to explain why the ICC's neces-
sary selectivity poses a serious threat to its legitimacy and to demonstrate
that current attempts to address the problem are insufficient because they
fail to link selection decisions to the goals and priorities that justify ICC
action. This Part aims to launch a discussion about how the selection of situ-
ations and cases for ICC adjudication can be made to promote appropriate
goals and priorities for the institution. It argues that an expressive approach
to selection decisions may enable the Court over time to ground selections
in goals and priorities that are accepted by relevant audiences, including
states, NGOs, local communities, and the global community.
171. Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 658 (noting that since the ICC lacks such democratic
accountability, any guidelines adopted "must face the irreducible tension between the policy
priorities of the international institution on the one hand, and those of the societies most di-
rectly affected by international crimes on the other"); Schabas, supra note 2, at 548-49
(asserting that the prosecutor's insistence that he is using objective standards when evidence
indicates otherwise is problematic).
172. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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A growing body of scholarship seeks to elucidate the philosophical un-
derpinnings of international criminal law adjudication. 73 Many of these
efforts focus on the purposes of punishment,'74 but, as David Luban has not-
ed, international criminal law's objectives extend beyond punishment. 75
While international criminal law punishment requires justification as much
as any other official infliction of pain, the rationales for international crimi-
nal law often relate as much to the processes of investigation, indictment,
trial, and judgment as to the result of punishment.'76 Thus, while substantial
agreement exists that the dominant rationales for punishment in national
law-deterrence and retribution-also apply to international criminal law,
commentators are increasingly focusing on restorative justice and expressiv-
ism as goals of international criminal law processes.'77
Despite the growing interest in the philosophical underpinnings of in-
ternational criminal law, neither commentators nor decision makers at the
ICC have sought to identify priorities among the institution's goals with
which to justify selection decisions. Like most criminal justice, ICC adjudi-
cation can be justified through multiple rationales acting synergistically, and
sometimes coming into conflict. In national criminal justice systems, where
resources are better matched to communal expectations of punishment, it is
usually unnecessary to justify particular prosecutions by reference to specif-
ic goals. As explained above, communities can generally agree on the result
of punishment even if they disagree on the underlying justifications.7 8 For
173. See, e.g., Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 71; Damaska, supra note 18, at 331;
Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MIcIH. J. INT'L L. 79, 83
(2009); Deirdre Golash, The Justification of Punishment in the International Context, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 201, 202 (Larry May & Zachary Hoskins
eds., 2010); Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, I J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 64 (2004); Koller, supra note 71; Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity
and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 4 (2002); Luban, supra note 18, at 575; Lar-
ry May, Defending International Criminal Trials, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 423, 423 (Larry May & Jeff Brown eds., 2010); Sloane, supra
note 5; Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 561 (2002); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense,
10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 685, 686 (2010).
174. See, e.g., Golash, supra note 173, at 211 ("The prevention of crimes is one of the
most important goals of punishment... "); Sloane, supra note 5, at 42-45 (arguing that the
primary goal of punishment in international criminal law is to express condemnation against
criminals); Tallgren, supra note 173, at 569 ("The consequentialist or relativist theory of pun-
ishment bases its justification for punishing on the possibility of prevention by means of
general or special prevention. Punishment looks to the future and contributes to greater utility
by preventing further criminality.").
175. Luban, supra note 18, at 575 (endorsing an expressivist view of international crimi-
nal law rather than more traditional retributivist theories); Amann, supra note 5, at 117 ("[T]he
larger goal of pursuing international criminal justice may be found, however, in a newer con-
cept, expressivism.").
176. See Amann, supra note 5, at 121-22.
177. See infra Part HI.A.3 and Part 11.B.
178. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the ICC, on the other hand, where resource limitations require decision
makers to select a few cases from among the thousands for which prosecu-
tion may be warranted, it is critical for decision makers to root their
selections in identified priorities among justifying aims.
What follows represents an initial effort to identify the appropriate pri-
orities to justify ICC selection decisions. I begin by examining the dominant
theories of the ICC's goals-retribution, deterrence, and restorative jus-
tice-to determine whether they provide an adequate basis to justify
selecting particular situations and cases for prosecution. I conclude that they
do not, at least most of the time. Instead, I argue that the ICC's primary ob-
jective in making selection decisions should be to express global norms.
This emphasis on norm promulgation is justified for two reasons. First, in
light of its resource constraints, the ICC is simply unable to make significant
contributions to the other goals in most situations, whereas its stature as a
global organization renders it particularly effective at global norm promul-
gation. Second, as a descriptive matter, an expressive orientation makes
sense of the ICC's complementarity regime in a way that the other theories
do not. To be clear, I am not arguing that retribution, deterrence, and restora-
tive justice are irrelevant as rationales for ICC action. On the contrary, each
of these theories helps to justify ICC prosecutions, and their importance will
vary according to the circumstances of particular cases. Rather, my argu-
ment is that global expression should usually be the ICC's priority when it
selects situations and cases for adjudication over other potential situations
and cases.
A. Failure of Dominant Theories to Justify
Selection Decisions
1. Retribution
Although retributive theories take a variety of forms, 1 7 9 all retributiv-
ists share the belief that desert justifies the infliction of punishment and
mandates its quantity.180 The concept of desert is complex and contested.'
Typically, desert is considered to be a function of two factors: (1) the seri-
ousness of the harm caused or risked by a crime; and (2) the defendant's
culpability as to that harm.' z
179. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 38-48
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing different strands of retributive theory that have developed over
time).
180. Id.; see also Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Venge-
ful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 145 (2008).
181. See Robinson, supra note 180, at 145; see also Robert Blecker, But Did They Lis-
ten? The New Jersey Death Penalty Commission's Exercise in Abolitionism: A Reply, 5
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 27 (2007) ("Retributivists split into different camps, disagree-
ing among themselves about the calculus of desert.").
182. Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living Standard
Analysis, 1 OxEoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1991) ("Seriousness of crime has two dimensions:
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Retribution, along with deterrence, are the most frequently invoked
justifications for international criminal law punishment.183 The ICC's pri-
mary rallying cry-"an end to impunity" 1 4 --rings of retribution. Most
scholars who have considered the question, however, reject retribution as a
justification for ICC adjudication, or at least they express skepticism about
the Court's ability to serve retributive ends. 18 5 Such criticisms largely cen-
ter around the ICC's selectivity and the difficulty of inflicting
proportionate punishment for atrocity crimes. For example, Professor
Mark Drumbl argues that the ICC's high selectivity undermines its capaci-
ty to achieve retributive justice, and cites Hannah Arendt for the
proposition that the harm of international crimes is so great that terms of
imprisonment can never be retributively proportionate.186 Although
Drumbl is correct that the ICC's resource constraints limit the amount of
harm and culpability."). Culpability focuses primarily on the defendant's mental state as to the
harm caused-both intent and motive-and may also include factual circumstances bearing on
blameworthiness. See id. at 2-3. Cf Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary
Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 58
n. 103 (2002) (arguing that desert should look to mens rea rather than harm).
183. Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International
Criminal Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 444 (2001); see also Prosecutor v. Sherushago, Case
No. ICTR 98-39-S, 20 (Feb. 5, 1999) (noting that retribution and deterrence remain the pri-
mary objectives); Henham, supra note 173, at 72; Sloane, supra note 5, at 47-52.
184. See About the Court, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/
(last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
185. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 18, at 151 (arguing that retribution is insufficient
justification for international criminal law because a variety of political factors motivate pun-
ishment); Amann, supra note 5, at 116; Koller, supra note 71, at 1025-26 (asserting that
retributive justifications have had little influence in international criminal law because they
have been discredited in domestic criminal justice systems); Koskenniemi, supra note 173, at
9 (arguing that criminal trials are more complex than inflicting punishment or retribution, but
rather are part of broader "transitional justice"); Tallgren, supra note 173, at 583 (asserting the
ICC's adoption of complementarity limits the role of the ICC in achieving retributive justice).
But see May, supra note 173, at 426 (espousing retribution as partial justification for interna-
tional criminal law); Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a
Retributivist Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRiM L. REV. 273, 278 (2005)
(proffering a relational theory of retributive justice in international criminal law); Dan Markel,
The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 389, 421 (1999) (arguing that particularized amnesty proceedings in international
criminal law are justified by retributivist principles).
186. DRUMBL, supra note 18, at 151-54, 156-57 (citing Letter to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 17,
1946), in HANNAH ARENDT & KARL JASPERS, CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 54 (Lotte
Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimberm trans., 1992)). Arendt wrote that:
"The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what
constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It may
well be essential to hang Gdring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to
all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems." Id. (Letter 43). This criti-
cism does not apply to all international crimes, however. In particular, war crimes that do not
amount to crimes against humanity or genocide are often susceptible to proportionate punish-
ment. Robert Sloane adds that international criminal law can never be as successful as national
criminal justice in exacting retribution given its physical and moral distance from the crimes
and affected communities. Sloane, supra note 5, at 50-5 1.
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retribution it can exact, and very serious crimes stretch the notion of propor-
tionality, retribution may nonetheless provide a partial justification for the
Court's work. 117 Even national systems do not punish all wrongdoers, but
retribution can justify the punishment they do inflict. In the same way,
retribution provides some justification for ICC adjudication even if the ICC
cannot inflict retribution on all those who deserve it and the punishments it
awards do not always appear satisfactory in terms of proportionality.
Whatever its force as a justification for punishment, retribution does not
provide an adequate basis for most ICC selection decisions. First, retributive
theory generally fails to justify selecting certain defendants and not oth-
ers.188 In the strictest Kantian formulation, retributivism requires that all
persons deserving punishment be punished.18 9 Such a categorical directive
of course provides no basis for resource allocation decisions. In spite of this
theoretical limitation, Professor Michael Cahill has suggested that an "abso-
lutist retributivist" faced with resource constraints might endorse
prosecuting the greatest possible number of offenders regardless of the seri-
ousness of their crimes.1 90 Allocating resources in this way, however, would
likely undermine the legitimacy of even well respected national courts,
and would certainly do so at the ICC. It would be senseless for the ICC to
select the easiest and cheapest cases to prosecute so that it could pursue a
few more defendants out of the vast numbers of those deserving punish-
ment in situations all over the world. A prosecutorial strategy that focused
on easy-to-convict low-ranking soldiers and allowed leaders to go free
would thus undermine the ICC's legitimacy with most relevant audiences
and would certainly do so at the international level. t9 '
Moreover, even assuming retributivists could agree to a model of
highly selective justice, a selection strategy focused on maximizing retri-
bution through ICC prosecutions would be very difficult to implement.
Such an approach would require decision makers to rank potential defend-
ants in terms of their relative desert. Desert, however, is notoriously
difficult to measure.t 92 Scholars who have sought to theorize desert have
187. See May, supra note 173, at 426.
188. See Cahill, supra note 73, at 870 (criticizing retributive theories for failing to pro-
vide a model of "real" world justice).
189. Id. at 826; see also Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Bargains
and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2003) (claiming that the conflicting im-
peratives of retributivism in the face of immunity and plea deals constitute a fatal flaw in the
theory); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 179, at 38, 38-39 (writing that retributivism looks backward, bas-
ing justification for punishment upon the moral desert of the offender's actions).
190. Cahill, supra note 73, at 849.
191. The criticism of Richard Goldstone's early efforts to prosecute low-level defendants
is evidence of this effect. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 73, at 852. Rather than attempt to theorize desert, Ca-
hill relies on actual sentencing schemes based on the questionable assumption that legislatures
followed retributive principles in assigning punishment amounts. Id.
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taken one of two approaches: deontological or empirical. Deontological
retributivists seek to measure desert-both harm and culpability-by ap-
peal to moral principles. For example, the renowned philosopher Joel
Feinberg argued that harms should be ranked according to the extent to
which they invade "welfare interests," "security interests," or "accumula-
tive interests,' 1 93 and professors Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg
have suggested that harm should be gauged according to its effects on in-
dividual living standards. 194 Deontologists similarly assess culpability
according to moral values. 195 Deontological assessments of desert are said
to be "derived from fundamental values, principles of right and good," and
therefore "will produce justice without regard to the political, social, or
other peculiarities of the situation at hand."196 Empirical approaches, on
the other hand, measure desert according to "the community's intuitions of
justice."'197 Scholars such as Paul Robinson have conducted social science
studies from which they extrapolate a variety of factors that they claim
influence people's assessments of blameworthiness. They assert that such
assessments or intuitions are consistent across social, cultural, and eco-
nomic divides.'98 In fact, some assert that these "intuitions of justice" have
a basis in biology.199
Neither of these methods of measuring desert provides an appropriate
basis for the ICC to make selection decisions. Deontological retributiv-
ism's claim to universal truths is highly contested, as are all such claims.
Deontological retributivism is therefore particularly ill suited to the di-
verse context of international criminal justice.200 Empirical measures of
desert are no less problematic. The claim that "intuitions of justice" derive
from a moral organ shared by all humans has been convincingly at-
193. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 182, at 7-10.
194. Id. at 6-7.
195. See Robinson, supra note 180, at 148 ("The deontological conception of desert
focuses not on the harm of the offense, but on the blameworthiness of the offender, and is
drawn primarily from the arguments and analyses of moral philosophy."). In particular, culpa-
bility is assessed according to judgments about the moral wrongfulness of particular mental
states such as negligence, recklessness, and intent.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 149.
198. Id. at 165.
199. See, e.g., John Darley, Realism on Change in Moral Intuitions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1643, 1643 (2010) (discussing perspective that people's judgments regarding punishment and
justice are due in part to evolution of cognitive biases); J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retribu-
tive Emotions, CRAM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1982, at 3, 8 (suggesting biological
explanation for human desire for retributive justice); Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Founda-
tions of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2003) (arguing humans' quick
assignment of blame is a result of the triggering of cognitive elements by certain impulses).
200. Sloane, supra note 5, at 77 ("[R]etributivism-with its characteristic discourse of
'just deserts,' blameworthiness, and the restoration of some moral balance-remains strongly




tacked.20 1 In fact, empirical evidence suggests the opposite-notions of
justice are highly contested and depend on a range of social, political, and
economic factors. 20 2 Moreover, even proponents of empirical desert
acknowledge that agreement about desert is "less pronounced" beyond
"the core of wrongdoing. '20 3 They have not extended the theory to ordinal
rankings of the kinds of large-scale and systematic atrocity crimes gener-
ally at issue in international criminal law.
There may be exceptional cases in which essentially the entire world
agrees that an individual is more deserving of punishment than others who
have also committed serious international crimes-Hitler and Pol Pot
come to mind. Moreover, if the ICC were conceived as a proxy for nonfunc-
tioning national systems, an argument might be made that it should
prioritize cases according to the shared intuitions of the local population
about who most deserves punishment. However, as currently configured, the
ICC does not have the resources or expertise to replace nonfunctioning na-
tional courts around the world. Moreover, the contexts in which
international crimes are committed almost inevitably involve populations
that are divided in their perceptions of desert. 2' Thus, in the vast array of
cases the ICC will have no globally accepted basis for choosing defend-
ants based simply on desert.
As such, when the ICC prosecutor attempts to justify selection deci-
sions in retributive terms he elicits skeptical responses and engenders
challenges to the Court's legitimacy. For example, the decision to prosecute
Sudanese President Bashir has been articulated as founded significantly on
Bashir's high level of desert.20 5 In Africa, such pronouncements have been
redolent of Western hegemony and neocolonialism.
216
201. See Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1531, 1533, 1567 (2010); cf. Nathan Hanna, Say What? A Critique of Expressive Re-
tributivism, 27 L. & PHIL. 123, 123 (2008) ("Retributive arguments often rely on controversial
intuitions of questionable reliability and justificatory power.") (footnote omitted).
202. Braman et al., supra note 201, at 1533 (asserting human intuitions about wrongdo-
ing are based on malleable social constructs).
203. See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Empirical Desert 33 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Public Law
Research Paper No. 08-29, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=l 148907##.
204. See JULIE MERTUS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 56-57 (undated), available at http://www.cla.purdue.edu/history/
facstaff/Ingrao/si/Report-10g.pdf (observing differing national views of "commensurability of
guilt" provide grounds for controversy in the ICTY, specifically noting that Croats were sur-
prised at the number of Croatian defendants indicted because the Croatian perspective saw the
war as a "matter of Serb aggression against innocent parties").
205. See, e.g., Interview by U.N. News Centre with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor
for the Int'l Criminal Court (June 5, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers
.asp?NewsID=13 (explaining importance of Bashir's prosecution because he was leader of a
"massive campaign orchestrated against the citizens").
206. See Jalloh, supra note 2, at 462-63 (quoting African politicians and scholars who
consider the ICC akin to "colonialism" and "imperialism"). Similarly, when the ICTR prose-
cutor's decision to engage in one-sided prosecutions is articulated as an assessment of relative
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2. Deterrence
Deterrence theory emanates from utilitarian moral philosophy,
27
which holds that actions should be evaluated according to their tendencies
to maximize happiness, either average or aggregate. 208 Specific deterrence,
along with the related concept of incapacitation, seeks to avoid repeated
criminal conduct by a particular offender.209 General deterrence looks to
avert criminality in the public at large. 210 The dominant model of deter-
rence theorizes that punishment can effectuate deterrence in economic
terms. Criminal law is thus conceived as precipitating a cost-benefit analy-
sis in the minds of rationally calculating prospective criminals.
211
Deterrence theorists believe that by shaping criminal law rules they can
affect individuals' decisions about whether to commit crimes. Such deci-
sions are said to be based on an assessment of the likelihood of
apprehension and the cost of conviction-usually in terms of length of
imprisonment. 212 The theory asserts that optimal deterrence can be
achieved by manipulating these factors.
Many criminal law theorists, including many retributivists, accept that
the existence of a criminal law system has some deterrent effect.213 The
principal debates about deterrence center around: (1) whether it is a legit-
imate justification for punishment given that it treats offenders as
desert, it engenders controversy in light of the very serious crimes committed by the other
side. See Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 49,
50-51 (2011) (criticizing the ICTR's decision not to prosecute war crimes committed
by Tutsis).
207. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, I THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARA-
TIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 248-49 (2007) ("All four of these goals-general deterrence,
special deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation-are grouped under the general heading of
'social protection' as the purpose of punishment ... . The genesis of social protection as a
rationale for punishment lies in the utilitarian theory developed by Beccaria and Bentham: The
suffering of the prisoner is justified as necessary to achieve the greater good of improving the
welfare or happiness of society.").
208. Id. at 193-94 ("Utilitarians are divided about whether they wish to pursue aggregate
happiness or average happiness.").
209. Id. at 247.
210. Id.
211. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1221 (1985) (framing the deterrence question as "what criminal penalties are op-
timal to deter" criminal activity of rational actor).
212. See id. at 1205-14 (analyzing "optimal criminal penalties" to maximize deter-
rence).
213. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the For-
mulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951
(2003) ("There seems little doubt that having a criminal justice system that punishes violators,
as every organized society does, has the general effect of influencing the conduct of potential
offenders. This we concede: Having a punishment system does deter.").
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instrumental to social goods;214 and (2) whether it works-that is, whether
legal rules can in fact be manipulated to effectuate deterrence. 215 Scholars
who answer the second question in the negative argue, for instance, that
potential offenders are not aware of the law, are not rational calculators, or
do not perceive the cost of crimes as outweighing the benefits.216 Such
arguments are hard to refute because of the difficulty of proving the coun-
terfactual-that criminal conduct would have occurred but for the
existence of particular legal rules.
2 t7
Deterrence is frequently invoked to justify the work of international
courts and tribunals. For example, the U.N. Security Council seems to
have implicitly endorsed a deterrence rationale when it established the ad
hoc tribunals under Chapter VII, a provision authorizing measures to
maintain and restore international peace and security. Moreover, interna-
tional prosecutors justify their policies in part based on deterrence,2 18 and
international criminal law judges rely on deterrence in sentencing defend-
ants.
2 19
Nonetheless, as with retribution, most commentators are skeptical of the
ICC's ability to deter potential criminals. 2 1 Critics of the deterrence
214. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTI-
CAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 79 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1st ed. 1999) ("[T]he human being and
in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by
this or that will at its discretion .... ).
215. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 213, at 951.
216. Id. at 953, 954-56.
217. Cf id. at 977-78 (discussing complexities of determining, weighing, and analyzing
various deterrence factors).
218. See, e.g., Press Release, ICC OTP, Prosecutor Opens Investigation in the Central
African Republic, ICC-OTP-20070522-220 (May 22, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20reeases/2007/prsecutr%20opens% 2 0investigation
%20in%20the%20central%20african%20republic?lan=en-GB (quoting the ICC prosecutor as
saying: "In the interests of deterring future violence and promoting enduring peace in the region,
we have a duty to show that massive crimes cannot be committed with impunity. We will do our
part, working through our judicial mandate").
219. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, 1 2128-29 (June
10, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/l00610judgement.pdf (affirming the
ICTY's commitment to deterrence); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing
Judgment, T 16 (July 19, 2007) (noting that deterrence is important in establishing the world's
lack of tolerance for serious crimes against international humanitarian law and human rights);
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 1 28 (Sept. 4,
1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKambanda%5Cdecisions%5C
kambanda.pdf (justifying a sentence of life imprisonment in part upon the notion that
would-be perpetrators of mass atrocity must be dissuaded through demonstrating that the
global community is not prepared to tolerate serious violations of international criminal law).
220. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 18, at 169; Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death
Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (2005) ("The evidence on the death
penalty as a deterrent is mixed and its success remains a point of contention in the social sci-
ences."); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 17 (2005) (citing David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 473 (1999)); Wippman, supra, at 474.
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rationale argue principally that international criminals are not rational calcu-
lators221 and that the likelihood and severity of punishment by international
courts are too low to generate deterrence. 222 Some scholars have even
suggested that international criminal law may promote rather than deter
criminal conduct in some circumstances. 223 Other commentators are more
sanguine, however.224 Juan Mendez, the ICC's Special Advisor on Crime
Prevention, points to one situation where the threat of ICC action appears to
have stopped hate speech that threatened to spark genocide.
225
The debate about whether the ICC is capable of deterring potential
criminals may be impossible to resolve in light of the problem of counter-
factual proof. In any event, for present purposes it is sufficient to assume
that deterrence, like retribution, provides a partial justification for the ICC's
work. Nonetheless, deterrence theory also fails to supply an adequate basis
for making selection decisions at the Court. First, in the same way that re-
tributivism has difficulty ranking defendants according to desert, deterrence
theory says nothing about which crimes constitute greater and lesser set-
backs to social welfare. 22 6 Without a way to rank the disvalue of different
kinds of conduct, the ICC cannot decide how to allocate scarce deterrence
221. See e.g., Sloane, supra note 5, at 72-73.
222. DRUMBL, supra note 18 at 169-70; Alexander, supra note 122, at 12 ("More likely
than not, the ICC will often confront Darfur-like situations in which the power with physical
control over suspects is unwilling to turn over suspects and cannot be compelled to do so ab-
sent outside military intervention."); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal
Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 832
(2006) (discussing existence of informal sanctions typically more severe than those of an
international tribunal); Wippman, supra note 220, at 477-78 (arguing that the conflict in Bos-
nia mobilized all aspects of society in ways unlikely to be halted for fear of prosecution).
223. See e.g., Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 222, at 827-31 (discussing "political opportun-
ism effects" by which politicians embrace the rhetoric of international criminal tribunals to
avoid substantive reforms).
224. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 10 (2001); Jonathan I. Chamey, Editorial
Comment, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 462 (1999) (con-
sistently prosecuting leaders may eventually deter those who provoke the circumstances that
encourage international crimes); May, supra note 173, at 427 ("Deterrence, like retribution,
can give us a partial defense of international criminal law in that in many cases the threat of
punishment will have an effect on behavior, at least lessening the likelihood of harmful behav-
ior if not completely eliminating such behavior."); Theodor Meron, Centennial Essay:
Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
551, 557 (2006); Theodor Meron, From Nuremburg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 110-
11 (1995) (arguing that international criminal law would have a greater deterrent effect if
prosecutions were more consistent and national legal systems prosecuted similar offenses in a
similar way).
225. ICC, The Importance of Justice in Securing Peace, ICC Doc. RC/STIPJ/INF.3, 1 18
(May 30, 2010) (by Juan Mendez).
226. Cahill, supra note 73, at 852; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 213, at
964-65 (discussing examples where deterrence-based recidivist statutes may impose heavy
punishment without consideration of a specific crime's relative harm to society).
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resources. 217 If the ICC had the resources and expertise to serve as a proxy
for local justice, it might be possible to allocate prosecutorial resources to
maximize deterrence of the crimes that a particular society finds most dele-
terious to its well being. However, any attempt to determine which crimes
most detract from the happiness of all humans worldwide would be futile.
Moreover, if ICC prosecutions in fact deter some potential criminals,
there is no evidence to suggest which ones, nor is such evidence likely to
emerge since people rarely admit to having contemplated crimes they decid-
ed not to commit. ICC judges took different positions on how selection
decisions affect deterrence in decisions concerning admissibility in the
Lubanga and Ntaganda cases. The Pre-Trial Chamber judges expressed the
view that the ICC can best maximize its deterrent effect by restricting ad-
missibility to senior leaders responsible for serious crimes. 228 According to
these judges, deterring leaders is most important and is best accomplished
by prosecuting leaders. The Appeals Chamber judges rejected this approach,
noting that non-leaders are sometimes responsible for very serious crimes
and that excluding this category of perpetrators would detract from the
Court's deterrent potential. 29 Although these decisions concerned admissi-
bility rather than choices among admissible cases, deterrence theory
suggests that failing to prosecute categories of perpetrators even if their
crimes are technically admissible would undermine deterrence.
In sum, even accepting the much-contested premise that ICC action is
capable of effectuating deterrence, a deterrence-based framework for
selecting situations and cases for prosecution would be at least highly
impracticable, if not impossible, to develop.
3. Restorative Justice
While ICC adjudication is most frequently justified in retributive or de-
terrent terms, a competing narrative has developed, focusing on the needs of
affected local populations, that is often described as restorative justice.
230
Restorative justice is a relative newcomer to criminal law theory, and the
concept itself remains highly contested.23 1 The debates surrounding the term
227. Dan M. Kahan, The Theory of Value Dilemma: A Critique of the Economic Analysis
of Criminal Law, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 643, 644-45 (2004) ("Unless we know whether and
how much we disvalue a particular species of conduct, we can't determine whether the cost of
deterring any particular amount of it is worth paying.").
228. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, Decision Con-
cerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006, 1148-50, 54 (Feb. 24, 2006),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf.
229. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the Prosecu-
tor's Appeal, 73-75 (July 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 183559.pdf.
230. See Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace With Justice: The International Criminal
Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 209, 275 (2008).
231. See John Braithwaite, Narrative and "Compulsory Compassion," 31 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 425, 425-26 (2006) (noting that restorative justice's "values framework is not settled
and clear").
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include: (1) whether it refers principally to process, values, or outcomes;
(2) what practices qualify as restorative; and (3) how restorative justice
should interact with the traditional criminal justice system.232 Typically, re-
storative justice is envisioned as an alternative or adjunct to prosecutions
and connotes a process whereby victims and offenders work collaboratively
to heal the harm caused by the offense.233 "The purpose is to restore victims,
restore offenders, and restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can
agree is just.' '234 Whether such restorative processes should replace or com-
plement prosecution is a matter of debate.23 5 The key principles at the heart
of restorative justice are that crime should be understood not merely as an
act against the state, but as an offense against a particular victim or victims
and relevant communities. Societal responses to crime should therefore fo-
cus on repairing the damage caused rather than on penalizing the offender.
236
As a criminal court, the ICC is not primarily an institution of restorative
justice. Nonetheless, a variety of goals are ascribed to the Court that aim at
implementing restorative justice principles. At the individual level, the ICC
purports to contribute to the restoration of the victims of the crimes it adju-
dicates by allowing victims to participate in the prosecutorial process 237 and
232. Kathleen Daly, The Limits of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective, in HAND-
BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 134, 135 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006). For
sources discussing restorative justice, see NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 285 n.776
(2007).
233. See United Nations Basic Principles on Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters, E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, Annex $ 2, U.N. Doc. E/2002/30 (July 24, 2002) (de-
fining restorative justice processes as "any process in which the victim and the offender, and,
where appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a crime, partici-
pate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally with the
help of a facilitator. Restorative processes may include mediation, conciliation, conferencing
and sentencing circles"); Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Concep-
tion of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 228-29. In the past few decades, such
alternative processes as victim-perpetrator conferences and mediation have gained traction in
various parts of the world, including Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. See id. at 229.
Moreover, for many years before their adoption in Western countries, restorative justice prac-
tices were common in non-Western communities, including those in Rwanda and Uganda.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. SCi. 161, 164 (2007) (describing modem efforts as "variations on" Rwandan and Ugan-
dan restorative processes). Generally, restorative justice practices are limited to crimes that are
less serious than those under the ICC's jurisdictions. Cf id. at 175 ("[In very serious cases
(murder, rape, and serious assault) restorative justice is ancillary or supplemental, not substitu-
tionary, to formal adjudication.").
234. Luna, supra note 233, at 228.
235. COMBS, supra note 232, at 140.
236. Luna, supra note 233, at 228-29.
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 68; Brianne N. McGonigle, Bridging the Di-
vides in International Criminal Proceedings: An Examination into the Victim Participation
Endeavor of the International Criminal Court, 21 FLA. J. INT'L L. 93, 96 (2009) ("This partic-
ipatory regime is an attempt to make a court that punishes individual perpetrators as well as a
court that focuses on administering restorative and reparative justice.") (footnote omitted).
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by providing for reparations. 238 Thus one author has written that the Rome
Statute reflects the recognition that victims have "an interest in restorative
justice. '23 9 Beyond individual victims, the work of the ICC is said to con-
tribute to reconciliation of communities in conflict and thus to long-term
peace and security.240 In this sense, restorative justice is about prevention of
future crimes. The view that the ICC can foster reconciliation rests on a be-
lief that reconciliation requires accountability, truth telling, or both, and that
the ICC can supply the former with convictions and the latter by building
the historical record.
24 1
Whether or not it is appropriate for the ICC to pursue any of these re-
storative justice goals is controversial. While a few authors advocate
transforming ICC processes to better achieve restorative justice goals,
242
many conclude that such objectives should not be a primary focus of the
Court.243 For example, some commentators argue that allowing victims to
participate in the determination of guilt further stacks the deck against al-
ready disadvantaged defendants by essentially permitting multiple
238. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 75.
239. Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparation to Victims, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 85, at 262, 264.
240. See G.A. Res. 65/12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/12 (Nov. 23, 2010) ("Recognizing the
role of the International Criminal Court in a multilateral system that aims to end impunity,
establish the rule of law, promote and encourage respect for human rights and achieve sustain-
able peace."). The belief that international criminal law can promote peace and security is
reflected in the Security Council's creation of the ad hoc tribunals under its Chapter VII man-
date to take actions to restore and promote international peace and security. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 38-39 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/l5002.htm (finding establishment of tribunal was
an appropriate measure to restore and promote international peace and security); S.C. Res.
827, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (expressing the conviction that creation of a
tribunal "would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace").
241. See Aukerman, supra note 182, at 81 (discussing role of accountability in reconcili-
ation practices); Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 263, 278 (2003) (quoting WILLIAM J. LONG & PETER BRECKE, WAR AND
RECONCILIATION (2003)) ("[Systematic research on societies in conflict suggests that] social
order is restored by a 'forgiveness process characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the
identity of the former belligerents, partial justice, and a call for a new relationship.' ").
242. For example, Nancy Combs has argued that international criminal justice should
strive to "impose[] retributive sanctions pursuant to restorative processes." CoMas, supra note
232, at 141. She proposes a process whereby defendants would be encouraged to plead guilty
in exchange for reduced sentencing, but would be required first to complete restorative obliga-
tions such as providing a full and complete accounting of their crimes. Id. See also FINDLAY &
HENHAM, supra note 74, at 275 (urging a transformation of international justice process to
better accommodate restorative justice principles without sacrificing retribution).
243. See Aukerman, supra note 182, at 79-80 (concluding that "the reparative paradigm
of restorative justice offers little justification for prosecution"); Ramji-Nogales, supra note 74,
at 10 ("For example, the defendants' rights to confrontation and to a speedy trial may conflict
with the victims' interest in telling their stories as witnesses; in some cultural contexts, the
latter might be more important than the former.").
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prosecutors. 244 Moreover, critics charge that the very limited amount of rep-
arations the Court can provide to a small number of victims hardly offers a
convincing justification for its work.245 Finally, the Court's current prosecu-
tor has rejected historical record building as an ICC goal on the grounds that
the Court is not "well suited" to the task.
246
Nonetheless, like retribution and deterrence, restorative justice should
not be entirely rejected as a justification for the ICC's work. ICC
prosecutions may well help to restore some victims, offenders, and
communities under some circumstances. That said, the Court should not
strive to maximize its restorative impact through its situation and case
selection decisions. As currently configured, the ICC does not have the
resources or proximity to local populations to make significant direct
contributions to restoring victims or communities that have suffered mass
violence. As such, the ICC should not, for example, select one situation over
another based on the greater need for reconciliation in a particular
population. Nor should it select cases based on the desires of particular
victims to participate in criminal prosecutions or receive reparations.
Instead, as elaborated below, the ICC should focus on its expressive impact
at the global level in the hopes that its various justifying aims will be
indirectly achieved as the norms it promotes are strengthened and
entrenched throughout the world.
B. An Expressive Theory
This Section advances the argument that in making selection decisions
the ICC should aim primarily to express global norms. This is not to say that
the ICC should ignore the other goals discussed above. In deciding whether
to investigate and prosecute situations and cases, the prosecutor and judges
should consider whether ICC action will contribute to retribution, deter-
rence, restorative justice, or some combination of the three. But when the
Court is faced with having to choose particular situations and cases over
others that also deserve its attention, such decisions should aim to maximize
the Court's expression.
Expressive theories posit that law, like other forms of expression, mani-
fests states of mind, including beliefs, attitudes, and intentions. 247 Law,
244. See McGonigle, supra note 237, at 124-25; see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor, V 5-14
(July 11, 2008) (Pikis, J., dissenting in part) (asserting victims' participation is inappropriate
because it violates the statute and the principle that adversarial proceedings are between only
the prosecution and defense).
245. Cf WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 913 (2010) (showing evidence that Victim's Trust Fund
operating costs exceeded contributions to the Fund); Aukerman, supra note 182, at 79-80.
246. DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 15, at 10.
247. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504-05 (2000).
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therefore, has "social meaning. 248 Such meaning derives not from the intent
of the person making or enforcing the law, but rather from the ways in
which relevant communities understand and interpret the law in light of ex-
isting social norms.2 49 An expressivist's normative agenda therefore includes
both crafting law to express valued social messages and employing law as a
mechanism for altering social norms.
25 °
A number of theorists, including Dan Kahan, advocate expressivism as
a justification for criminal punishment.2 1 Such theorists view crime as an
expressive act and consider punishment justified when it counters the
wrongful expression inherent in the criminal act.25 2 Kahan further asserts
that punishment is necessary to condemn wrongdoing when the relevant
community would interpret other forms of expression as inadequate. 253 For
example, in many cultures a monetary sanction in response to a serious
crime like murder or rape would be viewed as insufficient condemnation.
2 4
Norm expression through criminal law can function as a form of preven-
tion-discouraging crime by entrenching values-and as a means for
communities to affirm their common identities.
255
A growing number of scholars have turned to expressive theories to
justify international criminal law processes and punishment.256 Courts have
248. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597
(1996).
249. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022-24 (1996). Anderson and Pildes go so far as to say that the social meanings of an act "do
not actually have to be recognized by the community, they have to be recognizable by it, if
people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny." Anderson & Pildes, supra note 247,
at 1525.
250. Sunstein, supra note 249, at 2022-24 (discussing the relationship between law,
changing social norms, and expressive aspects of lawmaking).
251. See Kahan, supra note 248, at 593 (describing the various benefits provided by
expressivist theory); see also JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970); Bernard
E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn ": Implications for Research Design and Methods
of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & Soc'v REV. 179 (2000)
(discussing implications of a new emphasis on social meaning for social-scientific research).
252. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1622, 1641 (1998) (claiming that "an expressively effective punishment must make clear
that we are in fact disgusted with what the offender has done").
253. Kahan, supra note 248, at 600; see also Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with
Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075-76 (2006).
254. See Kahan, supra note 248, at 600.
255. See Sunstein, supra note 249, at 2027 ("A society might identify the norms to
which it is committed and insist on those norms via law, even if the consequences of the in-
sistence are obscure or unknown.").
256. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS
OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 13 (2001); DRUMBL, supra note 18, at 173; Amann, supra note 5,
at 120; Damaska, supra note 18, at 353 (emphasizing the stigma of conviction); Luban, supra
note 18, at 575; Sloane, supra note 5, at 85 ("Over time, punishment by international criminal
tribunals can shape as well as express social norms."). But see Turner, supra note 220, at 17
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also sometimes endorsed this rationale. 257 Moreover, although Moreno-
Ocampo has not explicitly articulated an expressive approach to selections,
some of his statements and decisions appear to reflect an expressive
orientation. For example, in his 2009-2012 Prosecutorial Strategy document,
Moreno-Ocampo states that his office will select a limited number of incidents
within a given situation for prosecution "to provide a sample that is reflective
of the gravest incidents and the main types of victimization." 258 The
prosecutor's strategy of selecting a representative sample of charges may
suggest a purpose to express condemnation of all the varieties of wrongdoing
perpetrated in a situation.259 Moreno-Ocampo's decision to bring a case
involving the killing of a relatively small number of peacekeepers in Sudan
may also suggest an expressive purpose to condemn attacks on
peacekeepers.260 Similarly, the controversial decision to charge Congolese
defendant Thomas Lubanga only with crimes related to child soldiers may
have been animated by expressive goals. There were apparently practical
reasons to charge Lubanga even though the investigation was incomplete-
national authorities were threatening to release him from custody.
261
Nonetheless, the decision to proceed in the absence of evidence of arguably
more serious crimes such as murder and rape seems to reflect a desire to
promote the relatively new and ill-established norm against the recruitment
and use of child soldiers.
62
A focus on norm expression is particularly appropriate for the ICC for
several reasons. First, as a descriptive matter, expressivism makes sense of
the ICC's structure, including its high degree of selectivity and its ability to
(arguing that international criminal law does not promote norms, but rather stirs up local back-
lash).
257. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSLJ4-15-T, Sentencing
Judgment, 15 (Apr.8, 2009) (endorsing the view that punishment in international criminal
law should reflect the revulsion of the international community and denounce the defendant's
conduct).
258. PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012, supra note 7, at 6.
259. The strategy of representative charging could also be aimed at providing some satis-
faction to victims whose direct persecutors will not be punished or contributing to the
historical record, although the prosecutor has denied attempting to create "comprehensive
historical records." Id.
260. OTP, ICC, Eighth Rep. of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UN Security Council
Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), 56 (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
BBA77B57-C81C-4152-988C-D8D953471453/279075/8thUNSCreportsenttoUNENGl.pdf
("Such attacks constitute violent crimes of exceptionally serious gravity and consequences for
the victims and for the international community.").
261. See REPORT ON FIRST THREE YEARS, supra note 126, at 8.
262. Fatou Bensuda, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement at the OTP Monthly Media
Briefing 3 (Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/53FB2CF6-B86C-4026-
A8DC-FA2FC2450BCA/277236/FB_20060828_en5.pdf ("It is the view of the Office of the
Prosecutor that the abuse of child soldiers has gone largely unrecognized and unpunished for
too long.... Regardless of the outcome of these proceedings, the hearing represents an un-
precedented opportunity to shine a spotlight on this abuse of children worldwide.").
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decline to proceed "in the interests of justice. 263 The ICC's selectivity is
significantly less problematic if one adopts a primarily expressive theory of
the institution's work rather than one focused on deterrence or retribution.
Both deterrence and retribution are undermined by the ICC's inability to
prosecute the vast majority of international crimes. The ICC can inflict ret-
ribution on but a handful of perpetrators, and can provide only a minor
disincentive to prospective criminals. On the other hand, the ICC may effec-
tively promote important moral norms with a small number of illustrative
prosecutions.
Certainly, as Mark Drumbl has pointed out, international criminal law's
selectivity limits its expressive potential. 264 But unlike in national systems
where failure to prosecute is often interpreted as acquiescence in wrongdo-
ing,265 the ICC is not expected to respond to all serious violations of
international criminal law-it simply does not have the resources to do so.
Moreover, despite a strong trend toward criminal punishment, there is no
consensus in the international community that punishment is the only ap-
propriate response to international crimes.2 66 Failure to prosecute particular
situations or cases at the ICC is therefore much less likely to be viewed as
expressing approval than it would be at the national level.
The expressive focus also helps to explain the ICC's ability to decline
prosecution in the "interests of justice." If deterrence or retribution were
the primary purposes of the ICC, it would seem inappropriate to permit
263. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 53.
264. See DRUMBL, supra note 18, at 176; Aukerman, supra note 182, at 88-89 (stating
that demonstrating international criminal law's ability to express values is undermined by
selectivity and the strictures of the trial process).
265. Kahan, supra note 253, at 2075-76; see also Charles Cheney Hyde, Editorial
Comment, Concerning Damages Arising from Neglect to Prosecute, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 140,
141 (1928) ("It is said in substance that when the State neglects to prosecute it is to be deemed
to approve of or condone the wrongful acts of those who did violence to the claimant, and to
assume a responsibility therefor").
266. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 122, at 29-30 (noting that the ICC's commitment to
combating impunity may complicate situations where a government provides amnesty to crim-
inals in order to promote peace); PHUONG PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS: A
POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECON-
STRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 35-42 (Human Rights Ctr. U.C. Berkeley ed., 2007)
(noting survey evidence in Uganda that showed that despite seventy percent of respondents
believing the Ugandan military committed war crimes in the north, when asked whether they
preferred "peace with amnesty" or "peace with trials," eighty percent favored peace with am-
nesty and seventy-six percent claimed that pursuing trials at the present would endanger
peace). The same survey found that ninety percent favored the establishment of a truth com-
mission in Uganda. Id. at 4. See also Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY
IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004)
(criticizing international efforts to end impunity in Rwanda and claiming that the government
of Rwanda has declined to establish a truth commission for fear of a broader picture of re-
sponsibility being established among the Rwandan people). Kahan argues there is such a
consensus at the national level in the United States. See supra notes 251-252 and accompany-
ing text.
Winter 20121
Michigan Journal of International Law
non-prosecution in the "interests of justice." Retribution assumes that
prosecution is always a necessary response to wrongdoing and deterrence
would be undermined whenever an offender walks free. On the other hand,
expression is only necessary when the message is not already being con-
veyed. The "interests of justice" provision recognizes that sometimes
nonprosecutorial mechanisms can adequately express condemnation of seri-
ous crimes at the international level.267 When a national government engages
in a truth commission process, lustration, or traditional justice mechanism,
ICC prosecution may no longer be necessary to serve justice. The question
of which nonprosecutorial mechanisms adequately express condemnation is
a controversial one that requires further exploration.
268
In addition to these structural reasons to accept the primacy of expres-
sive goals for the ICC, as a normative matter, global expression is the most
appropriate role for the institution. Most of the crimes at issue in interna-
tional criminal law are especially worthy of condemnation relative to
national crimes in light of their gravity.269 Moreover, some of those
crimes-particularly those committed during armed conflict and by gov-
ernments against their own people-are especially in need of expressions of
condemnation since they have historically been tolerated by the internation-
al community.27 Finally, the ICC's global platform and scope make it an
especially effective mechanism for expressing shared social norms.
271
Moreover, a transparently expressive approach to selection decisions
has the potential to generate increased consensus around the work of the
ICC. As explained above, in order for the Court to gain legitimacy it must
develop the perception among relevant audiences that it selects appropriate
situations and cases for investigation and prosecution. The current incoher-
ence around the Court's goals hinders its ability to generate such agreement.
267. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 83, at 483 n.8 (noting that there was debate over
whether prosecution should be sought in all instances, even when prosecution would threaten
young and transitioning democracies, in light of the efficacy of South Africa's Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission proceedings in achieving repentance and forgiveness).
268. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 108-10 (examining Uganda's efforts to
introduce alternative justice mechanisms and alternatives to ICC jurisdiction).
269. See id. at 128 (explaining that the "broader aspiration" of international criminal law
makes it focus on situations where gross atrocities have occurred, such as Uganda); cf
Amann, supra note 5, at 128 (discussing the hierarchy of severe crimes appearing before in-
ternational criminal tribunals).
270. See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 Am. J. INT'L L. 551, 554 (2006) (noting that in the pre-World War I era, states
rarely prosecuted their own nationals for war crimes despite a growing number of treaties
codifying war crimes and calling for national enforcement).
271. Amann, supra note 5, at 95 (noting expressivism has "special force in international
criminal law"); Damaska, supra note 18, at 345-47 (explaining expressivist goals of interna-
tional criminal courts); Sloane, supra note 5, at 93 ("ICC sentencing judgments, like the
statute itself, hold a similar potential to influence the practice and policy of states by acting as




Furthermore, for the reasons already explained, it will be very difficult for
the Court to develop consensus around its choices if it attempts to root them
in retribution, deterrence, or restorative justice. Relevant audiences are un-
likely to agree about who most deserves punishment, where deterrence will
be most effective, or what populations most require restoration. On the other
hand, if the ICC focuses on promoting the norms of its constitutive commu-
nities, it has the greatest chance of developing support for its work.
Developing consensus around the Court's work requires not just
agreeing that expression is the appropriate focus for the ICC, but also de-
termining which norms are most appropriate for ICC expression and what
the appropriate priorities should be among such norms. These tasks are
complex. Just as the international community has failed to provide the ICC
with clear priorities among potential goals, no agreement exists about what
norms are the most appropriate for ICC expression. For example, judges and
commentators disagree about whether a hierarchy exists among internation-
al crimes. Some argue that genocide is the worst crime, followed by crimes
against humanity and then war crimes. 272 According to that view, the norm
against genocide should be given priority in selecting cases for international
norm expression. Others have taken the position, however, that no such hier-
archy exists and would therefore object to a hierarchy-based selection
strategy.273 Some argue that the ICC should give priority to situations involv-
ing crimes with high numbers of victims, while others suggest the Court
should focus on systematic crimes committed by government actors.
2 74
In the short term, international agreement on such questions is unlikely.
However, a transparently expressive approach to selection decisions may be
272. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in
Sentencing Appeal, 16 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 2000) (Separate
Opinion of Cassese, J.) ("[W]henever an offence committed by an accused is deemed to be a
'crime against humanity', it must be regarded as inherently of greater gravity, all else being
equal (ceteris paribus), than if it is instead characterised as a 'war crime.' "); Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, 26 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997)
(Joint Separate Opinion of McDonald & Vorah, JJ.) (noting a "crime against humanity is a
more serious crime" than a war crime); Danner, supra note 183, at 420 (arguing "that the
chapeaux of the crimes under international law should be read to form a hierarchy of crimes,
connoting increasing levels of harm caused by a defendants actions").
273. See, e.g., Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-l-Abis (ICTY), 69 ("After full con-
sideration, the Appeals Chamber takes the view that there is in law no distinction between the
seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime."); Erdemovic, Case No. IT-
96-22 (ICTY), 19 (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Li, J.) (asserting that "the gravity of
a criminal act, and consequently the seriousness of its punishment, are determined by the
intrinsic nature of the act itself and not by its classification under one category or another").
274. Compare Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address, Integrating the Work of the ICC
into Local Justice Initiatives, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 497, 498 (2006) (emphasizing the
number of victims as criterion in assessing gravity), with Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity,
Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 26, at 227, 229 ("[Tlhe OTP should privilege systematicity, social alarm, and the
State criminality instead, because crimes that exhibit those features are inherently more seri-
ous than crimes that simply involve numerous victims.").
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able to generate agreement over time. Under such an approach, the Court's
decision makers would announce the norms to which they have accorded
priority in explaining the grounds for their selection decisions rather than
claiming that their selections are based on "objective" and "impartial" eval-
uations of gravity or the interests of justice. In some cases, they might also
have to explain the impact of practical factors on their decisions. For exam-
ple, with regard to the Lubanga case, the prosecutor might have said not
only that he proceeded in the case due to the risk of Lubanga's imminent
release, but also that his intent was to express the norm against recruiting
child soldiers. Relevant audiences-states, NGOs, local communities, and
the broader international community-would then react, providing the deci-
sion makers with feedback on their normative choices. Decision makers
would incorporate such feedback into their future decisions. Through this
dialogic process, incremental progress would ideally be made toward greater
consensus on norms and priorities.
Such decisions would not be easy and would raise many questions to
which there are no ready answers. For example, to what extent should deci-
sion makers value the perspectives of state actors versus NGOs or local
communities when their views conflict? Also, to what extent should the
Court, in particular the prosecutor, seek to act as a reformer, advancing new
or controversial norms as opposed to simply reflecting norms already wide-
ly accepted in the international community? Such questions require further
exploration, but the answer to the latter question depends in part on the per-
sonal legitimacy of the decision makers. A charismatic prosecutor will have
more room to advance a progressive agenda than one whose judgment is
less widely respected.275 Moreover, as some have suggested, it may be time
to reconsider the extent of the ICC prosecutor's role in selection deci-
sions." 6 Perhaps such decisions should involve the input of political actors
who are more representative of the ICC's various constitutive communities.
Regardless of the identities of decision makers, ICC constituencies, in
particular state actors, will need to play a more active role in reacting to se-
lection decisions for the iterative process suggested herein to work. To date,
state actors have demonstrated a reluctance to comment on the ICC's selec-
tion decisions, perhaps out of fear of being perceived as interfering with the
Court's independence. However, this attitude actually hinders the Court's
ability to develop a greater sense of the goals and priorities that states and
other constituencies value. For an expressive approach to selection decisions
to build consensus around the Court's goals, it will be critical not only for
selection decision makers to express clearly the values underlying their
choices but also for ICC stakeholders to provide the Court feedback on
those choices.
275. WEBER, supra note 11, at 301, 328 (arguing that sociological legitimacy can derive
from a leader's charisma).
276. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at 541-42 (arguing for a greater role for political
factors in ICC). But see Rastan, supra note 98, at 584-87 (rebutting Schabas's arguments).
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There is no guarantee that the dialogic process described above will suc-
ceed in generating consensus over time. The various relevant audiences may
simply disagree about the norms the ICC should promote. In that case, the
ICC is unlikely to develop and maintain high levels of legitimacy. On the oth-
er hand, if the effort to build consensus on norms meriting global expression
succeeds, the ICC's legitimacy will be substantially enhanced because its
actions will reflect the values of its constituencies.277
CONCLUSION
The ICC's need to select a small number of cases for prosecution from
an enormous pool of potential cases represents one of the greatest
challenges to its legitimacy. If it fails to select well, it will be condemned as
illegitimate and perhaps even abandoned by dissatisfied states. Currently, no
theoretical framework exists to explain how the ICC should select situations
and cases for investigation and prosecution. The Court was created without
clear goals and priorities under the banner of the ambiguous concept of
gravity, and continues to reference gravity to justify its selection decisions.
Although gravity served a constructive role in the ICC's creation, it cannot
sustain the weight of justifying selection decisions. Instead, those wishing to
ensure an important place for the ICC in the global legal order must urgently
engage the task of clarifying the institution's goals and priorities.
This Article has sought to contribute to that endeavor by arguing for an
expressive theory of selection decisions. Such an approach has the potential
to enhance the ICC's legitimacy for several reasons. First, by clarifying the
Court's goals it will enable evaluative audiences to debate the merits of the
value choices animating ICC selection decisions rather than speculating
about the improper motivations of decision makers.278 Such transparency
about values (as opposed to the transparency of unmoored criteria discussed
above) and the open debate it engenders should assist the Court in ensuring
that the goals and priorities it pursues reflect the values of its constitutive
communities. Second, by clarifying that it does not choose cases according
to the relative desert of perpetrators or the deterrent benefits expected, the
ICC can avoid criticisms stemming from the inherent incommensurability of
such goals. Finally, at a minimum the explicit adoption of a global expres-
sivist agenda would have the salutary effect of lowering expectations about
what the ICC can accomplish. 279 Currently, the lack of clarity about the
ICC's goals enables various audiences to ascribe to the Court the purposes
and priorities they value most. Victims in particular are led to believe that
277. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
278. Rastan, supra note 98, at 592-93 (arguing that prosecutors should focus on values
in addition to judgments about fairness).
279. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transi-
tional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 86-87 (2006) (calling for lower expectations in regard to
transitional justice mechanisms' potential in the wake of mass atrocity).
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the Court will help them heal the wounds they have suffered and rebuild
their communities. When, as is inevitable, the Court cannot deliver on such
hopes, victim communities are embittered and view the Court as illegiti-
mate. Adoption of an explicit global expressivist agenda would make sense
of an institution created to "end impunity" with the resources to prosecute
but a few exemplary cases.
